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Over the last decades individual field data has become more and more avail-
able to researchers. In three self-contained chapters, this thesis is concerned with
the analysis of such data and some associated challenges.
An important aspect therein is what is referred to, e.g. by Fisher (1966) and
Manski (1995), as the identication problem in the social sciences. It arises once
the observed variables on the right hand side of a structural equation are correlated
with the unobserved variables.1 In econometrics this is usually referred to as the
problem of simultaneity or endogeneity. Chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis address
associated challenges, focussing on the identication of structural parameters of
interest in the presence of endogeneity.
Koopmans (1945, p. 462) was among the first to study identification and notes
that “economic data are not controlled values selected for the purpose of an exper-
iment. Economic variables are produced by society.” For example, in a standard
bivariate regression model,
(1.1) yi = α + βxi + εi,
in which yi is individual i’s wage and xi the number of years of schooling, the latter
could be endogenous because it depends on the idiosyncratic wage premium εi. In
an alternative formalization there are additional so-called confounding variables
such as ability which determine both wages and schooling choices.2 In both cases,
the returns to an additional year of schooling, β, are not identified: they can in
general not be recovered from observations.
According to Koopmans (1945, p. 462) this “leads to the requirement that sta-
tistical methods of fitting take into account the formation of economic variables
through a complete system of equations.” Therefore, a “separation between prob-
lems of statistical inference. . . and problems of identification (Koopmans 1949, p.
132)” becomes necessary.
A formalization of the notion of identication can at least be traced back to
Koopmans and Reiersol (1950) with important contributions by Hurwicz (1950a,
1950b), Koopmans, Rubin, and Leipnik (1950), and Wald (1950). They typically
refer to an econometric model as a structure and say that two structures S and
S ′ are observationally equivalent (indistinguishable) if, conditional on exogenous
variables, the two distributions of endogenous variables generated by the struc-
tures S and S ′ are identical for all possible values of the exogenous variables.
The structure S is (uniquely) identifiable if there is no observationally equivalent
structure S ′. Finally, a parameter θ of a structure S is identifiable if it is the same
for all structures S ′ observationally equivalent to S .
1 We follow Goldberger (1972) and call an equation structural if it represents a causal link
rather than a mere empirical association.
2 See Fisher (1935, Ch. 7) and Yates (1937) for the notion of confounding.
3Several approaches have been suggested in order to overcome the problem
of endogeneity and achieve identification. For example, attempts to formulate
systems of simultaneous equations were already made in papers by Sewall Wright
on path coefficitents in the 1920’s and 1930’s (Wright 1934, e.g.). In this context,
Koopmans (1945, p. 450, italics added) even emphasizes that “the formation of
economic variables can only be described by a system of simultaneous equations.”
A more reduced form approach is to exploit properties of so-called instrumen-
tal variables which, in the textbook formulation, are correlated with the observed
right hand side variable, xi in our case, but uncorrelated with the unobserved error
term, εi. It is well-known that such a source of exogenous variation can, under
appropriate conditions, be used to uncover the effect of xi on yi. As opposed to
a system of structural equations, in which the causal link between the instrument
and the endogenous variable is modelled, it is a reduced form approach because it
only exploits the correlation between the endogenous variable and the instrument.
The use of such instrumental variables can be traced back to Appendix B of Philip
G. Wright (1928).3
Chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis try to contribute to the modern literature on iden-
tification and estimation using instrumental variables. Chapter 2 is concerned with
the problem of evaluating the impact of a program on an outcome variable, e.g.
the effect of on-the-job training on wages. The model we consider is completely
nonparametric. In a stripped-down version, xi from above is a binary indicator
for the treatment decision that takes on the value 1 if an individual participated in
a program. The framework that is used in Chapter 2 is more general than (1.1)
because it allows the effect of xi on yi, the idiosyncratic gains from participation,
to be stochastic. That is, (1.1) becomes
(1.2) yi = α + βixi + εi
with xi, εi, and βi being scalar random variables.
We face a fundamental identification problem because not only the treatment
decision, xi, and the error term, εi, might depend on each other, but also the treat-
ment decision and the idiosyncratic gains from participation, βi. Imbens and
Angrist (1994) were the first to exploit monotonicity of the treatment decision
in the instruments in order to identify an average treatment effect parameter us-
ing instrumental variables. More recently, Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2000a,
2000b, 2005) suggested estimation of a variety of treatment effect parameters us-
ing a local version of their approach. However, identification hinges on the same
monotonicity assumption that is fundamentally untestable. We investigate the sen-
sitivity of respective estimates to reasonable departures from monotonicity that
3 For a historic perspective see parts of Bowden and Turkington (1984), Goldberger (1972),
Morgan (1990), Angrist and Krueger (2001), and Stock and Trebbi (2003).
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are likely to be encountered in practice and relate it to properties of a structural
parameter. One of our results is that the bias vanishes under a testable linearity
condition. Our findings are illustrated in a Monte Carlo analysis.
Thereafter, in Chapter 3, we propose and implement an estimator for identi-
fiable features of correlated random coefficient models with binary endogenous
variables and nonadditive errors in the outcome equation. The framework is sim-
ilar to (1.2) in nature but now xi is a vector consisting of one binary endogenous
variable and K > 0 exogenous variables. It is still nonparametric in the direction
of the unobservables but parametric in the direction of the exogenous covariates
in order to reduce the dimensionality of the estimation problem. The estimator we
propose is suitable, e.g., for estimation of the average returns to college education
if they are heterogeneous across individuals and correlated with the schooling
choice. The estimated features are of central interest to economists and are di-
rectly linked to the marginal and average treatment effect in policy evaluation.
They are identified under assumptions weaker than typical exclusion restrictions
used in the context of classical instrumental variables analysis. In our application
for the U.K., we relate levels of expected wages to unobserved ability, measured
ability, family background, type of secondary school, and the decision whether to
attend college.
While Chapters 2 and 3 focus on recovering identifiable features of a structural
equation, Chapter 4 follows a different approach. It is concerned with feedback
mechanisms in electronic markets that allow partners to rate each other after a
transaction. These mechanisms are considered crucial for the success of anony-
mous internet trading platforms. Rather than estimating a system of structural
equations we document an asymmetry in the feedback behavior on eBay, propose
an explanation based on the micro structure of the feedback mechanism and the
time when feedbacks are given, and support this explanation by findings from a
large data set. Our analysis implies that the informational content of feedback
records is likely to be low. We argue that the reason for this is that agents leave
feedbacks strategically. Negative feedbacks are given late, in the “last minute,” or
not given at all, most likely because of the fear of retaliative negative feedback.
Conversely, positive feedbacks are given early in order to encourage reciproca-
tion. Towards refining our insights into the observed pattern, we look separately
at buyers and sellers, and relate the magnitude of the effects to the trading part-
ners’ experience.
Hence, the econometric approach that is taken in Chapter 4 is to describe in-
dividual feedback behavior using standard nonparametric methods in a first step.
This descriptive evidence is paired in a second step with institutional details and
economic reasoning in order to derive normative conclusions that aim at improv-
ing the feedback mechanism.
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2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Monotonicity
A fundamental identification problem in program evaluation arises if the treat-
ment decision depends on the idiosyncratic gain from participation even if we
condition on observables. This selection into treatments on unobservables pre-
cludes the use of the usual econometric tools such as matching type estimators,
conventional instrumental variables analysis, and standard simultaneous equations
models because their respective estimates of treatment effect parameters are gen-
erally biased.
Imbens and Angrist (1994) were the first to exploit monotonicity of the treat-
ment decision in instrumental variables in order to identify a local average treat-
ment effect parameter (LATE analysis). These instrumental variables are assumed
to be independent of the pair of potential outcomes conditional on covariates in
the outcome equation. They have identifying power if, conditional on these co-
variates, they have an impact on the treatment probability. The monotonicity as-
sumption is that a hypothetical change in the instruments either has no impact on
a unit’s treatment status, or changes its treatment status in the same direction as it
does for all other units for which it has an impact.
More recently, Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2005; HV in the
remainder) suggested estimation of a variety of treatment effect parameters using
a local version of their approach called local instrumental variables analysis (LIV
analysis), drawing on a stronger condition on the support of the propensity score,
the treatment probability conditional on the instruments.
Both approaches, LATE and LIV analysis, are in principle able to cope with
unobserved dependence between the treatment decision and the outcome. They
are intuitive, elegant, and easy to implement. Their generality consists of the fact
that neither a parametric specification of the joint distribution of unobservables
and observables, nor peculiarities of the data set or the economic question of in-
terest are of need. However, identification in both approaches hinges on the same
monotonicity assumption. In general, estimates of treatment effects will be biased
if it does not hold.
A violation of the monotonicity assumption is nicely motivated in Example 2
of Imbens and Angrist (1994). When we think of two officials screening appli-
cants for a social program, we would expect that for every set of characteristics of
the applicants (the covariates in the outcome equation) the admission rate differs
between the two officials. When it is unlikely that the identity of the official affects
the outcome of participation or nonparticipation in the program, then, conditional
on the characteristics of the applicant, this identity qualifies as an instrument. Sup-
pose the admission rate for official A was higher than for official B. Then, in this
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setup monotonicity holds whenever any applicant who would have been accepted
by official B is accepted by official A. Imbens and Angrist (1994) note that “this
is unlikely to hold if admission is based on a number of criteria.” In this case,
monotonicity is violated.
In this paper, we aim at quantifying the degree of violation of the monotonic-
ity assumption in order to investigate the consequences of a violation when we
unjustifiably rely on this assumption. In particular, we investigate the sensitivity
of both LIV and LATE estimates to reasonable departures from monotonicity that
are likely to be encountered in practice. We focus on the bias in estimates of the
marginal and average as well as the local average treatment effect. Importantly,
highly sensitive estimates would question the suitability of LIV and LATE analy-
sis for applied work as the monotonicity assumption is fundamentally untestable
since it is identifying.1
It turns out that this can be done in a unifying approach because LATE and
LIV analysis are similar with respect to the identification strategy and only differ
with respect to the requirements on the support of the propensity score. In par-
ticular, conditional on covariates in the outcome equation, LIV analysis requires
derivatives of the expected outcomes with respect to the propensity score at infi-
nitely many values of the propensity score to be identified whereas LATE analysis
is based on a finite set of level estimates.
2.1.2 Local Departures From Monotonicity
The approach in this paper is to study the impact of local departures from monotonic-
ity on our estimates. Taylor series approximations to the bias terms are derived.
This is in the tradition of local specification error analysis suggested by Kiefer and
Skoog (1984).2 It has also been successfully applied by Chesher (1991), Chesher
and Schluter (2002) and Battistin and Chesher (2004) in the context of measure-
ment error. Lately, Chesher and Santos Silva (2002) studied the impact of un-
controlled taste variation in discrete choice models by modelling local departures
from a multinomial logit model.
The virtue of this approach is that it allows us to keep in touch with the original
structure. At the same time, we are able to explore what the sensitivity of LATE
and LIV estimates depends on when monotonicity is in fact violated. In our case,
1 HV propose a joint test for monotonicity and the existence of instruments. By itself,
monotonicity is fundamentally untestable.
2 Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996) take a different approach and relate the bias in conven-
tional IV estimates to the proportion of non-compliers, i.e. the units for which monotonicity is
violated, and the treatment effect heterogeneity. We feel that our approach is fruitful because it
allows us to express the treatment effect of non-compliers in terms of, up to an approximation
error, possibly identifiable quantities.
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the original structure consists of selection models of the form
D = 1I{ν(Z) ≥ V˜}
where 1I{·} is the indicator function, ν : Rk → R is a function of a k-vector of
instrumental variables, and V˜ is an unobserved individual threshold, which is con-
tinuously distributed with distribution function FV˜ . Moreover, Z and V˜ are as-
sumed to be independently distributed. From now on, we keep conditioning on
covariates in the outcome equation implicit.
These selection models imply monotonicity. To see this let w and z be two
values of Z with ν(w) < ν(z).3 Then, given V˜ , D can never change from 1 to 0 if Z
changes from w to z. This is the original monotonicity assumption of Imbens and
Angrist (1994). Vytlacil (2002) shows that such a selection model does not impose
any additional restrictions on the data generating process. Therefore, without loss
of generality, from now on, we represent the original LATE assumptions in this
form.
Central to our generalization
D = 1I{µ(ν(Z), σU) ≥ V˜},
µ : R2 → R, E[µ(ν(Z), σU)|Z] = ν(Z), is an additional scalar random component
σU which gives rise to additional individual heterogeneity and, under appropriate
conditions, directly leads to a violation of the monotonicity assumption whenever
σU is non-degenerate.4 For degenerate σU, however, the model is constructed so
that it is equivalent to the canonical selection model. In this framework, a local
departure from monotonicity is given by a change from σ = 0 to σ > 0.
The following example illustrates this point.
Example 1 (Random Coefficients): Consider the index selection model
D = 1I{Zγ˜ ≥ V˜}.
The canonical index selection model would postulate that γ˜ = γ, a k-vector
of parameters. In a probit model, e.g., the additional assumption is made that
V˜ is standard normally distributed. Then, given V˜ , if Zγ changes from wγ to
zγ > wγ, D can only change from 0 to 1, remain 0, or remain 1, but can never
change from 1 to 0. Now, let γ˜ be a vector of random coefficients γ˜ = γ+σU ·ι,
3 For any random variable A and any vector of random variables B we denote realizations
thereof by lowercase letters, the c.d.f. of A evaluated at A = a by FA(a), the conditional c.d.f.
of A given B = b evaluated at A = a by FA|B=b(a), and the respective p.d.f.’s by fA(a) and fA|B=b(a).
4 Conversely, Vytlacil (forthcoming) states conditions under which monotonicity still holds.
These conditions will not be assumed to hold in this paper.
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σ ≥ 0, ι being a k-vector of ones, and U non-degenerate and independent of
Z. This is an example for the generalized selection model motivated above.
If σ > 0, given V˜ , D is no longer monotone in Z because now, under fairly
general conditions on the distribution of U, there exist realizations u and u′
of U such that w(γ + σu · ι) > z(γ + σu′ · ι) while wγ < zγ. Consequently,
monotonicity is violated. On the other hand, this model nests the canonical
index selection model as the special case in which σ = 0. A local departure
from monotonicity is hence given by an external change from σ = 0 to a small
σ > 0. 
In this paper, we are interested in the bias of treatment effect parameter es-
timates that can be attributed to such a violation of the monotonicity assump-
tion. We derive a second order approximation to respective bias terms in σ about
σ = 0 that can be used to assess the accuracy of LIV and LATE estimates
without monotonicity. We show that the respective bias depends primarily on
the dependence between the individual gains from participation in the program,
Y1 − Y0, and the normalized selection threshold V = FV˜(V˜) from the selection
model, which is normalized to be uniformly distributed. Our results can be ex-
pressed in terms of a structural parameter, the so-called marginal treatment effect,
m(v) ≡ E[Y1 − Y0|V = v]. It was introduced by Björklund and Moffitt (1987) and
is the average treatment effect conditional on the selection threshold being equal
to a certain value v. In many applications such as returns to schooling, we would
expect this marginal treatment effect to be decreasing and possibly nonlinear in v
when we think of v as being psychic or effort costs.
We show that under appropriate assumptions, the bias in estimates of the mar-
ginal treatment effect at V = v is
σ2/2 ·
∂2m(v)
∂v2
+ o(σ2).
Here, ∂2m(v)/∂v2 can be replaced by an identified feature of the outcome equation
without changing the order of the approximation error. Hence, a bias correction
procedure is available if we have prior information about σ. In case no such prior
information is available, a sensitivity analysis can still be undertaken by evaluating
this expression at different values of σ. Moreover, according to our approxima-
tion, the bias is of order o(σ2) whenever ∂2m(v)/∂v2 is zero, independent of the
presence of any unobserved heterogeneity σU in the population. Following up
on this result, we show that if the marginal treatment effect is indeed linear in
V , which is a testable condition on the data generating process, and if additional
assumptions hold, estimates are unbiased. Arguably, this set of assumptions is
more general than the assumption of constant treatment effects which underlies
traditional instrumental variables analysis.
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Fig. 2.1: Intuition behind the main result.
Even though the respective support conditions needed for identification differ
LIV estimates of average treatment effect parameters as well as LATE estimates
can be expressed in terms of the marginal treatment effect. Therefore, our findings
translate directly into respective expressions for the bias in estimates of average
treatment effect parameters in the context of LIV analysis and the local average
treatment effect in the context of LATE analysis.
Example 2 is meant to give the intuition behind the main result.
Example 2 (Intuition, Example 1 continued): For the ease of the exposition
let FV˜ be known. According to our normalization V = FV˜(V˜) is uniformly dis-
tributed, an equivalent representation of the index selection model in Example
1 is
D = 1I{FV˜(Zγ˜) ≥ V},
and Pr(D = 1|Z) = Pr
(
V ≤ FV˜(Zγ˜)|Z
)
= E
[
FV˜(Zγ˜)
∣∣∣Z]. Notice that, since
only the left hand side of this equation is identified from observations, only
E
[
FV˜(Zγ˜)
∣∣∣Z] is known and in general, FV˜(Zγ˜) is not. Suppose we wanted to
identify m(0.4). In Section 2.2 we will show that m(0.4) can be estimated from
observations for which FV˜(Zγ˜) takes on values in a neighborhood around 0.4.
Under monotonicity, σ = 0 and hence FV˜(Zγ˜) is known because it is equal
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to FV˜(Zγ) which in turn is equal to Pr(D = 1|Z), recalling that FV˜ is known.
Consequently, m(0.4) is identified since now, we can select observations for
which FV˜(Zγ˜) = FV˜(Zγ) = 0.4. Now suppose σ and U are such that with
respective probability one half either FV˜(Zγ˜) = 0.2 or FV˜(Zγ˜) = 0.6 whenever
E
[
FV˜(Zγ˜)
∣∣∣Z] = 0.4. Then, monotonicity is violated and from observations
with E
[
FV˜(Zγ˜)
∣∣∣Z] taking on values around 0.4 we would estimate 0.5m(0.2)+
0.5m(0.6), the convex combination of points A and B in Figure 2.1. This
corresponds to point C only if the marginal treatment effect is linear in V .
Only then, our estimate of m(0.4) would still be unbiased even if monotonicity
failed to hold. 
Section 2.2 lays out the formal framework. Section 2.3 contains the main
theoretical results. We illustrate these findings and assess the accuracy of our ap-
proximation to the bias term in a Monte Carlo study which is carried out in Section
2.4. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Formal Framework and Identification
We adopt the usual convention in program evaluation and say that if a unit is not
treated, we observe an indicator variable D being equal to zero and a realization
of Y0 and if it is treated, we observe D being equal to one and a realization of
Y1. Usually, Y0 and Y1 are referred to as potential outcomes. They are real val-
ued scalar random variables. We write Y ≡ (1 − D)Y0 + DY1. Our analysis can
be thought of as being conditional on exogenous covariates as, e.g., in Vytlacil
(2002).
As we have argued in the introduction we focus on the class of models in
which identifying power is derived from monotonicity of the treatment decision
in the instruments. This is expressed in terms of the selection model
(2.1) D = 1I{ν(Z) ≥ V˜}
with ν : Rk → R being a function of the k-vector of instrumental variables. Sto-
chastic restrictions and regularity conditions are given below.
A 1 (Existence of Instruments): Z is independent of (Y0,Y1, V˜).
A 2 (Regularity Conditions I): (i) Y0 and Y1 have nite rst moments
and (ii) the distribution of V˜ is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue
measure.
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Assumption 1 presumes that the instruments can be excluded from the out-
come equation. This is a considerably weaker condition than conditional indepen-
dence in matching, for example. Assumption 2 (i) will ensure that all structural
parameters of interest are well defined. By Assumption 2 (ii) we can, w.l.o.g.,
normalize V˜ to be uniformly distributed.
Under this normalization, (2.1) becomes
(2.2) D = 1I{P ≥ V}
where P is shorthand notation for the propensity score P(Z) ≡ Pr(D = 1|Z),
the probability to observe an individual to be treated conditional on the vector of
instruments. Under Assumption 1 this probability is identified from observations.
2.2.1 Structural Parameters of Interest
The effect of a deviation from monotonicity on a variety of structural parameters
of interest can be expressed in terms of the marginal treatment effect
(2.3) m(v) ≡ E[Y1 − Y0|V = v].
The marginal treatment effect by itself is of economic interest in many applica-
tions.5 In this paper, we also focus on the bias in estimates of the population
average treatment effect
(2.4) ∆ATE ≡ E[Y1 − Y0] =
∫ 1
0
m(v) dv
and the local average treatment effect
(2.5) ∆LATE(vl, vh) ≡ E[Y1 − Y0|vl ≤ V ≤ vh] =
1
vh − vl
∫ vh
vl
m(v) dv,
where vl < vh.6 However, our results extend easily to other average treatment
effect parameters of interest such as the population average treatment effect on the
treated, for example.
Note that by Assumption 2 all parameters that are considered here exist.
5 See HV for a detailed discussion. For empirical studies of the returns to college education see
Björklund and Moffitt (1987), Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2005), Carneiro and Lee (2005),
and Klein (2006). In this context, V has the interpretation of unobserved ability which both has an
impact on the decision of whether to attend college and the return from doing so. The dependence
of this return on unobserved ability is of central interest to policy makers.
6 Angrist, Graddy, and Imbens (2000) derive the marginal treatment effect as the limit form of
the local average treatment effect and show that, conversely, the local average treatment effect is
an average marginal treatment effect, though not the population average.
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2.2.2 Identification of Structural Parameters
In this subsection we briefly review and connect the identification results by HV
and Imbens and Angrist (1994). We first turn to the former.
We call p a limit point of the support of P if P has a continuous density in a
neighborhood around p which is bounded away from zero. Note that at P = p
derivatives of differentiable functions of P are identified from observations.
Given Assumption 1 and 2 the marginal treatment effect is identified at V = p
if p is a limit point of the support of P. To see this write
(2.6) E[Y |P = p] = E[Y0] +
∫ p
0
m(v) dv,
where the integral is equal to
p · E[Y1 − Y0|D = 1, P = p] = p · E[Y1 − Y0|V ≤ p] = p ·
∫ p
0
m(v)/p dv
noting that the density of V conditional on V ≤ p is 1/p. Note also that this
representation heavily draws on the monotonicity in the selection model.
E[Y |P = p] is differentiable with respect to p since, by Assumption 2 (i), m is
integrable with respect to V . Differentiating both sides of (2.6) with respect to the
propensity score yields
∂E[Y |P = p]
∂p
= m(p)(2.7)
by Leibnitz’ rule. The left hand side is identified from observations at limit points
p so that the marginal treatment effect is identified at V = p, the desired result.
The local average treatment effect can be identified from observations under
weaker support conditions. Specifically, let w and z be two points of support of
P with pl < ph. Imbens and Angrist (1994) show that under Assumption 1 and 2
and the monotonicity in the selection model
E[Y |P = ph] − E[Y |P = pl]
ph − pl
= ∆LATE(pl, ph).(2.8)
Taking limits for pl → ph shows that (2.8) directly corresponds to (2.7).
HV emphasize that the local average treatment effect can always be expressed
as a function of the marginal treatment effect as well. They show that
∆LATE(pl, ph) =
1
ph − pl
∫ ph
pl
m(v) dv.
Finally, note that therefore, there are at least two alternative ways for identify-
ing the average treatment effect in this framework. First, if all p ∈ (0, 1) are limit
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points of the support of P the marginal treatment effect is identified at all values
of V in the open interval (0, 1) and the average treatment effect can be obtained
via (2.4) noting that the probability of V being either 0 or 1 is equal to zero and
first moments are finite. This is the approach suggested by LIV analysis. Alter-
natively, if 0 and 1 are in the support of P we can make use of the fact that the
average treatment effect is equal to ∆LATE(0, 1), which is identified in this case.
This is the approach suggested by LATE analysis.
A similar argument holds for the local average treatment effect. Both ap-
proaches differ with respect to the requirements on the support of the propensity
score but share their dependence on monotonicity. Therefore, we shall refer to
respective estimates as monotonicity estimates.
2.3 The Impact of a Deviation From the Monotonicity
Assumption
In this section we study the impact of local departures from monotonicity on
monotonicity estimates of structural parameters that can be expressed in terms
of the marginal treatment effect. First, local departures will be motivated and for-
malized in terms of a generalization of the selection model. Then, we study the
impact of such local departures on monotonicity estimates of the marginal treat-
ment effect. Finally, we use these results to derive expressions for the bias in
monotonicity estimates of the average and local average treatment effect.
2.3.1 Generalized Selection Model
Instead of (2.2) let
(2.9) D = 1I{Q(P, σU) ≥ V},
Q : R2 → R, with
E[Q(P, σU)|P] = P
and σ ≥ 0.7
We shall refer to Q(P, σU) as the individual shape function in the remainder
and assume that it is a nontrivial function of σU, where U is a continuously dis-
tributed non-degenerate scalar random variable. σU reflects, e.g., differences in
7 We stick to our normalization that V is uniformly distributed on the unit interval. We con-
sider it most instructive to think of V as being precisely the same random variable as before.
Of course, (2.2) is a normalized version of (2.1) and (2.9) is a normalized version of the model
D = 1I{µ(ν(Z), σU) ≥ V˜} from the introduction. An example of such a model would be the model
from Example 1 with normally distributed V˜ , a random coefficient probit model.
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preferences or risk attitudes which let, through the individual shape function, the
impact of observables Z on D differ across individuals. This additional random-
ness causes monotonicity to fail. Besides, U is assumed to be purely random.
A 3 (Random Noise): U is independent of Z and (Y0,Y1,V) and has
probability density function fU .
If σ > 0 the individual shape function is a finer measure of the treatment
probability than P. In particular, by V being uniformly distributed independent of
(Z,U),
Q(P, σU) ≡ Pr(D = 1|P, σU).
2.3.2 Impact of Local Departures from Montonicity
In this subsection we study the impact of local departures from monotonicity on
estimates of structural parameters that are based on the monotonicity assumption.
These impacts can be expressed in terms of the marginal treatment effect. The
generalized selection model that was developed above is central to this analysis.
In particular, monotonicity holds if σ = 0 and a local departure from monotonicity
is given by a change from σ = 0 to a small σ > 0.
We derive an approximation to the bias term by performing a second order
Taylor series expansion in σ about σ = 0. This yields an approximation to the
biased estimate of the marginal treatment effect at V = p which we compare to an
approximation to the true value.
In particular, if σ = 0, the representation for E[Y |P = p] in (2.6) is still valid
because the canonical selection model in (2.9) is equivalent to the generalized
selection model in (2.2). Therefore, if σ = 0 the marginal treatment effect is
identified at V = p. If σ > 0, identification of the marginal treatment effect fails
because the representation in (2.6) is no longer valid. A representation in which
we replace the propensity score by the individual shape function is not feasible
since the value of the individual shape function is not identified from observations
because (2.9) is not invertible in V .
The approximation will be derived under the following two assumptions. As
for notation, partial derivatives of a function f (a) with respect to its argument
evaluated at a = 0 are denoted by ∂ f (0)/∂a. Second and third partial derivatives
as well as cross derivatives are denoted accordingly.
A 4 (Regularity Conditions II): (i) Q(p, σu) and ∂Q(p, σu)/∂p are con-
tinuously differentiable in σu up to the third order around σu = 0 and (ii) m(v) is
three times continuously differentiable.
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A 5 (Pure Noise): We have (i) ∂2Q(p,0)
∂(σu) ∂p = 0 and (ii) ∂Q(p,0)∂(σu) = 1.
Assumption 4 is a regularity condition. The first part of Assumption 5 postu-
lates that the impact of infinitesimal changes in σU on the value of the individual
shape function at σU = 0 do not depend on the level of the propensity score. The
second part is a normalization. Furthermore, we normalize U so that E[U] = 0 and
E[U2] = 1. Then, σ is the standard deviation of the random component σU and
the first order approximation to the standard deviation of the variance of Q(P, σU)
conditional on P. The main result is summarized in the following theorem and its
two corollaries.
T 1: Let v be a limit point of the support of P. Then, under Assumptions
1-5 the bias in estimates of m(v) is given by
BMTE∗ = σ2/2 ·
∂2m(v)
∂v2
+ o(σ2).
Proof. Appendix. 
C 1.1: Let Assumptions 1-5 hold. The bias in estimates of the average
treatment effect is equal to
BATE∗ = σ2/2 ·
(
∂m(v)
∂v
∣∣∣∣∣
v=1
−
∂m(v)
∂v
∣∣∣∣∣
v=0
)
+ o(σ2)
provided that the support of P is equal to the open unit interval or contains the
points 0 and 1. The bias in estimates of the local average treatment effect between
vl and vh is equal to
BLATE∗ = σ2/2 ·
(
∂m(v)
∂v
∣∣∣∣∣
v=vh
−
∂m(v)
∂v
∣∣∣∣∣
v=vl
)
+ o(σ2)
provided that the support of P is equal to the open interval (vl, vh) or contains the
points vl and vh.
Proof. Appendix. 
C 1.2: Under Assumptions 1-5, if σ2 is known, a bias correction pro-
cedure in which we substitute biased estimates for BMTE∗, BATE∗, and BLATE∗ is
feasible in the sense that the order of the approximation error remains unchanged.
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Corollary 1.2 follows from the bias term being a multiple of σ2. This allows
us to use biased estimates of the marginal treatment effect and its derivatives to
estimate the bias term without changing the order of the approximation error. If
σ2 is unknown, a sensitivity analysis can still be undertaken in which we calculate
the approximation to the bias term for different values of σ.
A particularly interesting result is that the bias is of order o(σ2) if the marginal
treatment effect is linear in V = v, i.e. if ∂2m(v)/∂v2 = 0. This result is indepen-
dent of σ. This is a testable condition on the data generating process because it
implies that E[Y |P = p] is quadratic in p.
In fact, this observation yields identifying conditions not relying on monotonic-
ity which are weaker than the ones used in classical instrumental variables analy-
sis. We summarize this finding in a theorem.8
T 2: Let the marginal treatment effect be linear in v so that
E[Y |Q(P, σU) = q] = α + βq + γq2
for some constants α, β, γ. Moreover, let Assumptions 1-2 hold and let the vari-
ance of Q(P, σU) conditional on P be equal to σ˜. Then, the marginal, average,
and local average treatment effect are identied if the the support of the propensity
score contains at least three points.
Proof. We have
E[Y |P = p] = α + βE[Q(P, σU)|P = p| + γE[Q(P, σU)2|P = p|
= α + βp + γ
(
σ˜ + p2
)
= α˜ + βp + γp2,
where α˜ = α + γσ˜. Thus, β and γ are identified from observations. Consequently,
the marginal treatment effect,
m(v) = β + 2γv,
is identified at all v, and therefore, the average and local average treatment effect
are identified as well. 
To summarize, our analysis has shown that the curvature of the marginal treat-
ment effect in V determines the magnitude of the bias when monotonicity does
not hold. As a rule of thumb, we have that the less curved the marginal treatment
8 As before, we can think of the exposition here as being conditional on exogenous covariates.
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effect is in the value of the selection threshold V , the less biased monotonicity
estimates are when monotonicity does not hold.
The relationship between the curvature of the marginal treatment effect and the
bias of the monotonicity estimator as well as the accuracy of our approximation
are illustrated in the following Monte Carlo study.
2.4 Monte Carlo
We simulated data in order to characterize the bias that arises from a violation of
the monotonicity assumption as well as the accuracy of our analytical approxima-
tion to the bias term. For R = 1.000 repetitions and values of a curvature para-
meter ρ we generated N = 2.000 data points. Since biases in estimates of average
treatment effect parameters are functions of biases in estimates of the marginal
treatment effect we focus on the respective mean bias in estimates of m(0.5) as a
function of the curvature ρ.
Specifically, we drew values of P and V from a uniform distribution, respec-
tively, and let Q = P + σU, where σ = 0.2 and being U drawn from a uniform
distribution with support [−1, 1].9 Next, we calculated D = 1I{Q ≥ V}. Notice
that by construction, monotonicity of the treatment decision in Q holds whereas
monotonicity in P is violated. In the spirit of the empirical results in Carneiro,
Heckman, and Vytlacil (2005) we let
Y = 2.2 + 0.5Q − (1 − Q)
ρ+1
ρ + 1
+ ε,
where ε was drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 0.04. In
their application, the treatment decision is whether to attend college or not. For
ρ = 2 our simulations yield data similar to theirs. The marginal treatment effect at
V = q is given by the derivative with respect to Q, evaluated at Q = q:
m(q) = 0.5 + 1.5(1 − q)ρ.
It is decreasing in q. The second and third derivative are equal to ∂m(q)/∂q =
−1.5ρ(1 − q)ρ−1 and ∂2m(q)/∂q2 = 1.5ρ(ρ − 1)(1 − q)ρ−2, respectively. Observe
that for ρ = 1 the marginal treatment effect is linear in q whereas for ρ > 1 it is a
convex function of q. For low values of q , e.g. q = 0.3 this function is the more
convex the higher ρ.
9 The values of the individual shape function can be interpreted as approximating a probability
measure. Simulating them in a way such that they lie between zero and one turned out to impose
a number of additional restrictions on the relationship between P and Q. Hence, we decided to
pursue this ad hoc but clear way to generate them.
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Fig. 2.2: One draw of generated data for ρ = 2.
For this Monte Carlo, estimates of the marginal treatment effect as well as its
first and second derivative were obtained by fitting a third order polynomial to the
data.
Figure 2.2 shows one draw of generated data for ρ = 2. Solid lines are esti-
mated means over all repetitions. On the left, y is plotted against p and q. On the
right, the marginal treatment effect, m(q), is plotted against p and q. Obviously,
when we plot m(q) against q we get the marginal treatment effect itself. However,
plotting m(q) against perturbed values p of q yields a distribution of marginal
treatment effects for every p.
Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of estimates of m(0.5) that are based on
P and Q. Monotonicity of D with respect to Q holds by construction, whereas
monotonicity of D with respect to P is violated. The figure shows that estimates
based on P are in general upward biased and more dispersed.
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Fig. 2.3: Distribution of estimates of m(0.5) based on P and Q. ρ = 2. The true value is
0.875.
In Section 2.3 we have shown that the bias which arises from a violation of
the monotonicity assumption is the higher the more convex the marginal treatment
effect is in v. Next, in Figure 2.4, we plot the dependence of the mean bias in
estimates of the marginal treatment effect at V = 0.5 against ρ. Additionally, we
plot the analytical approximation to the bias term, σˆ2/2 · ∂2m(0.5)/∂v2, and the
estimated approximation, σˆ2/2 · ̂∂2m(0.5)/∂v2, where σˆ2 is the sample variance
of σU and ̂∂2m(0.5)/∂v2 is the estimate of the second derivative of the marginal
treatment effect at V = 0.5. It shows that here, the approximation is reasonably
accurate.
In general, our finding that the bias is the lower the more linear the marginal
treatment effect is in v seems to be confirmed in this Monte Carlo.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have investigated the sensitivity of estimates of treatment effect
parameters that hinge on monotonicity to violations of this assumption. An ana-
lytical approximation to the bias term has been derived. In general, we find that
estimates are the more sensitive to violations of monotonicity the more curvature
the marginal treatment effect exhibits in V . This analytical result was illustrated
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Fig. 2.4: The marginal treatment effect for different values of ρ on the left and the bias as
well as the accuracy of the approximation as a function of ρ, for V = 0.5, on the
right.
in a Monte Carlo study.
Moreover, the bias can be estimated from the data up to a parameter σ without
changing the order of the approximation error. Therefore, our results have prac-
tical relevance which we summarize in the following three points. First, a bias
correction procedure is available if there is prior knowledge on the variance of the
individual shape function conditional on the propensity score. Second, there is an
easy to implement way for applied researchers to qualitatively assess how sensi-
tive their respective results are to likely deviations from monotonicity. In partic-
ular, a sensitivity analysis can be carried out by calculation the bias for different
values of σ. Finally, our analysis reveals that whenever the marginal treatment
effect is linear in V , the bias is of order o(σ2).
It is well known that traditional instrumental variables analysis hinges on the
assumption of constant marginal treatment effects. This constitutes a special case
of the marginal treatment effect being linear in V . In Theorem 2, we have shown
that the assumption of a linear marginal treatment effect together with a condi-
tional variance restriction is a generalization of traditional instrumental variables
analysis which does neither rely on monotonicity as opposed to LIV analysis in
its original formulation, nor does it require a strong conditional independence
assumption to hold.
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Appendix: Proofs
Observe that by the regularity conditions in Assumption 2 all structural parame-
ters considered here exist. Moreover, observe that a second order Taylor series
expansion of the expressions considered below can be performed by the differ-
entiability of the individual shape function and the marginal treatment effect that
was introduced in Assumption 4.
We prove Theorem 1 using Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
L 1: Under Assumptions 1-4,
∂
∂p
E[Y |P = p]
=
∂
∂Q(p, 0)E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)]
+ σ2/2 ·
∂3
∂Q(p, 0)3E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)] ·
(
∂Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)
)2
+ σ2/2 ·
∂2
∂Q(p, 0)2E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)] ·
∂2Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)2
+ σ2 ·
∂2
∂Q(p, 0)2E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)] ·
∂Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)
·
∂2Q(p, 0)
∂(σu) ∂p
+ o(σ2).
Proof. The proof is in 5 steps.
First step: A second order Taylor series expansion of Q(p, σu) in σ about
σ = 0 yields
(2.10) Q(p, σu) = Q(p, 0) + σu · ∂Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)
+ (σu)2/2 ·
∂2Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)2
+ o(σ2).
Second step: By the definition of the propensity score, Assumption 3, and the
normalizations on U,
(2.11)
p = E[Q(P, σU)|P = p] = E[Q(p, σU)] = Q(p, 0) + σ2/2 · ∂
2Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)2
+ o(σ2).
Combining this with (2.10) yields
(2.12) Q(p, σu) = p + σu · ∂Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)
+ σ2/2 · (u2 − 1) ·
∂2Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)2
+ o(σ2)
and
(2.13)
∂
∂p
Q(p, σu) = 1 + σu · ∂
2Q(p, 0)
∂(σu) ∂p
+ σ2/2 · (u2 − 1)
∂3Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)2 ∂p
+ o(σ2).
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Third step: A second order Taylor series expansion of ∂E[Y |Q(P, σU) =
Q(p, σu)]/∂Q(p, σu) in σ about σ = 0 yields
∂
∂Q(p, σu)E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, σu)]
(2.14)
=
∂
∂Q(p, 0)E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)]
+
∂2
∂Q(p, 0)2E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)] ·
∂Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)
· σu
+
∂3
∂Q(p, 0)3E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)] ·
(
∂Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)
)2
· (σu)2/2
+
∂2
∂Q(p, 0)2E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)] ·
∂2Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)2
· (σu)2/2 + o(σ2).
Fourth step: We have
∂
∂p
E[Y |P = p]
=
∂
∂p
E[E[Y |Q(P, σU)]|P = p]
=
∂
∂p
∫
E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, σu)] fU(u) du
=
∫
∂
∂p
E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, σu)] fU(u) du
=
∫
∂
∂Q(p, σu)E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, σu)] ·
∂
∂p
Q(p, σu) fU(u) du
=
∫
∂
∂Q(p, σu)E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, σu)] ·
{
1 + σu ·
∂2Q(p, 0)
∂(σu) ∂p
+σ2/2 · (u2 − 1) ·
∂3Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)2 ∂p
}
fU(u) du + o(σ2),
where the first equality is by iterated expectations, the second follows from As-
sumption 3, the third from the integrand being finite, the fourth applies the chain
rule, and the fifth uses (2.13).
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Together with (2.14), this is
∂
∂p
E[Y |P = p]
=
∫ {
∂
∂Q(p, 0)E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)]
+
∂2
∂Q(p, 0)2E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)] ·
∂Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)
· σu
+
∂3
∂Q(p, 0)3E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)] ·
(
∂Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)
)2
· (σu)2/2
+
∂2
∂Q(p, 0)2E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)] ·
∂2Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)2
· (σu)2/2
}
×
{
1 + σu ·
∂2Q(p, 0)
∂(σu) ∂p
+ σ2/2 · (u2 − 1) ·
∂3Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)2 ∂p
}
× fU(u) du + o(σ2)
and this in turn is
=
∫ {
∂
∂Q(p, 0)E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)]
+
∂2
∂Q(p, 0)2E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)] ·
∂Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)
· σu
+
∂3
∂Q(p, 0)3E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)] ·
(
∂Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)
)2
· (σu)2/2
+
∂2
∂Q(p, 0)2E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)] ·
∂2Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)2
· (σu)2/2
+
∂
∂Q(p, 0)E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)] · σu ·
∂2Q(p, 0)
∂(σu) ∂p
+
∂2
∂Q(p, 0)2E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)] ·
∂Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)
· σu · σu ·
∂2Q(p, 0)
∂(σu) ∂p
+
∂
∂Q(p, 0)E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)] · σ
2/2 · (u2 − 1) ·
∂3Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)2 ∂p
}
× fU(u) du + o(σ2),
where we already let multiples of σ2 enter the remainder term. Using the normal-
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izations on U, E[U] = 0 and E[U2] = 1, this is
∂
∂p
E[Y |P = p]
=
∂
∂Q(p, 0)E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)]
+ σ2/2 ·
∂3
∂Q(p, 0)3E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)] ·
(
∂Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)
)2
+ σ2/2 ·
∂2
∂Q(p, 0)2E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)] ·
∂2Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)2
+ σ2 ·
∂2
∂Q(p, 0)2E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)] ·
∂Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)
·
∂2Q(p, 0)
∂(σu) ∂p
+ o(σ2).

L 2: Under Assumptions 1-4,
∂
∂p
E[Y |Q(P, σU) = p]
=
∂E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)]
∂Q(p, 0)
+
∂2E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)]
∂Q(p, 0)2 ·
∂2Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)2
· σ2/2 + o(σ2).
Proof. A second order Taylor series expansion of ∂E[Y |Q(P, σU) = p]/∂p in σ
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about σ = 0, using (2.11), yields
∂E[Y |Q(P, σU) = p]
∂p
=

∂E
[
Y
∣∣∣∣Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0) + σ2/2 · ∂2Q(p,0)∂(σu)2 + o(σ2)]
∂
(
Q(p, 0) + σ2/2 · ∂Q(p,0)
∂(σu)2 + o(σ
2)
)

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ=0
+

∂2E
[
Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0) + σ2/2 · ∂Q(p,0)
∂(σu)2 + o(σ
2)
]
∂
(
Q(p, 0) + σ2/2 · ∂Q(p,0)
∂(σu)2 + o(σ
2)
)2
×
∂
(
Q(p, 0) + σ2/2 · ∂Q(p,0)
∂(σu)2 + o(σ
2)
)
∂σ

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ=0
· σ
+

∂3E
[
Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0) + σ2/2 · ∂Q(p,0)
∂(σu)2 + o(σ
2)
]
∂
(
Q(p, 0) + σ2/2 · ∂Q(p,0)
∂(σu)2 + o(σ
2)
)3
×
∂
(
Q(p, 0) + σ2/2 · ∂2Q(p,0)
∂(σu)2 + o(σ
2)
)
∂σ

2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ=0
· σ2/2
+

∂2E
[
Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0) + σ2/2 · ∂Q(p,0)
∂(σu)2 + o(σ
2)
]
∂
(
Q(p, 0) + σ2/2 · ∂Q(p,0)
∂(σu)2 + o(σ
2)
)2
×
∂2
(
Q(p, 0) + σ2/2 · ∂2Q(p,0)
∂(σu)2 + o(σ
2)
)
∂σ2

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ=0
· σ2/2
+ o(σ2)
=
∂E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)]
∂Q(p, 0)
+
∂2E[Y |Q(P, σU) = Q(p, 0)]
∂Q(p, 0)2 ·
∂2Q(p, 0)
∂(σu)2
· σ2/2 + o(σ2).

Proof of Theorem 1. Follows directly from Lemma 1, Lemma 2, and Assumption
5. 
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Proof of Corollary 1.1. The proof for the average treatment effect is similar to the
proof for the local average treatment effect. We present the former. Since
∆ATE ≡ E[Y1 − Y0] =
∫ 1
0
m(v) dv
in order to obtain the bias in the average treatment effect, we have to integrate
over the bias in estimates of m(v) for values of v from 0 to 1. This yields
BATE∗ =
∫ 1
0
σ2/2 ·
∂2m(v)
∂v2
dv + o(σ2)
= σ2/2 ·
(
∂m(v)
∂v
∣∣∣∣∣
v=1
−
∂m(v)
∂v
∣∣∣∣∣
v=0
)
+ o(σ2).
Observe that this proof holds for both LATE and LIV analysis since the LATE
estimator can be written as an average over LIV estimates. 
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3. COLLEGE EDUCATION AND WAGES IN THE U.K.:
ESTIMATING CONDITIONAL AVERAGE STRUCTURAL
FUNCTIONS IN NONADDITIVE MODELS WITH BINARY
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES
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3.1 Introduction
In many econometric applications, the characterization of the impact of binary
variables on an outcome variable is of central interest. Examples are the impact of
an additional year of schooling, or attending college, on wages, or the impact of
participation in a labor market program on unemployment duration. Often, condi-
tional on observable covariates, these effects are considered to be heterogeneous
across individuals and possibly correlated with the binary choice variable. This is
true if the choice is based upon knowledge of the outcome that is superior to what
is observed in the data.
In this paper, we model the log of individual wages, which we denote by Y , by
a correlated random coefficient model of the form
Y = X′ϕ(D,U,V)(3.1)
D = 1I{P(Z) ≥ V},(3.2)
where D is the binary endogenous variable. It is equal to one if the individual
graduated from college. X is a K-vector of observable covariates in the wage
equation, (3.1). In our application, we exploit a uniquely rich birth cohort data
set, the British National Child Development Survey (NCDS), and include in X,
among other variables, the type of secondary school that was attended, the social
class of the parents, as well as other family background variables and accurately
measured ability test scores at the age of 7 and 11. Z is a vector of covariates in
the selection equation, (3.2), and includes the variables in X as well as the father’s
interest in the education of the child for which we assume that it can be excluded
from the wage equation. As we will see below, such an exclusion restriction
is not necessary for identification in our model but yields additional identifying
power. X and Z include a constant as their respective first elements. U is a vector
and represents “luck”, and V is a scalar entering both the wage and the selection
equation. It represents unobservable costs, benefits, and most importantly, talent
and unobserved ability which we suppose to have an impact on both wages and the
decision whether to attend college. Modelling this link is of economic interest and
important once we aim at estimating the impact of changes in D or X on Y from
non-experimental field data. As for stochastic restrictions, we assume that (U,V)
are jointly independent of (X,Z) and that U is independent of V . This implies that
P(Z) is identified from observations.
In this model, ceteris paribus effects of changes in observables, D and X, on
wages depend on unobservables U and V . In general, the model is not identified.1
1 The model in (3.1) and (3.2) is nonadditive in the unobservables. Moreover, the vector X, in
principle, could include approximating functions in a way such that the number of approximating
functions grows with the sample size. Then, along with Newey (1997), (3.1) could be interpreted
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However, we will show that under suitable conditions the expected level of wages,
Y , for a given D, X, and V ,2
E[Y |D = d, X = x,V = v] = x′E[ϕ(d,U, v)]
is identified from observations. We will refer to this identifiable feature of the
wage equation as the conditional average structural function (CASF) and to
E[ϕ(d,U, v)] as the vector of conditional average ceteris paribus effects, under-
standing the notion of ceteris paribus as holding all other factors constant, includ-
ing V , averaging only over U. We believe that not only average ceteris paribus
effects, where we average over V and U, are of interest but also their dependence
on V . In Section 3.3, we define the parameters of interest more formally and link
them to a variety of treatment effect parameters that are considered in the literature
on program evaluation.
Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2000a, 2000b; HV in the remainder) establish
nonparametric identification of the CASF under weaker stochastic restrictions.
They assume that (U,V) are jointly independent of Z conditional on X instead
of our assumption that (U,V) are jointly independent of (X,Z). However, they
require conditions on the support of P(Z) to hold conditional on X, whereas we
require them to hold only unconditionally.
To illustrate this point, nonparametric estimation of the CASF as suggested by
the identification result of HV is not feasible in our application because not only
the expected level of wages needs to be estimated conditional on X = x, D = d,
and P(Z) = p, but also its partial derivative with respect to p which requires
continuous variation of P(Z) conditional on D and X, a requirement that is not
met in our data because there is no such continuous variable in Z. This shows
that there is a tradeoff between flexibility of the model—the model by HV is fully
nonparametric—and data requirements.
Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2005) and Carneiro and Lee (2005) propose
what we shall refer to as the additive model. Write X as (1, X ′
−1)
′. Then, instead
of (3.1), which can be written as
Y = ϕ1(D,U,V) + X′−1ϕ−1(D,U,V),
they consider a wage equation of the form
Y = µ(D,U,V) + X′−1γ(D,U)
as a series approximation of a general nonseparable structural equation Y = g(X,D,U,V). To-
gether with (3.2) this is a triangular structure similar to the ones considered by Chesher (2003)
and Imbens and Newey (2003). The key difference, however, is that here (3.2) is not invertible in
V and hence identification fails since V enters as an argument. Chesher (2005) shows that in this
case set identification may still be feasible.
2 We will denote (vectors of) random variables by uppercase letters and their respective typical
elements by lowercase letters.
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and show that the CASF is identified under the same stochastic restrictions and
support conditions that we use in this paper.
One limitation of their model is that they do not allow for the effect of X on Y
to depend on V . This nonseparability is an important aspect of unobserved hetero-
geneity and is of economic interest in many applications with binary endogenous
variables. Estimates for the more general model that is proposed in this paper indi-
cate that these nonseparabilities are present in our data. For example, the expected
effect of the parents’ social class measured by the father’s occupation depends on
the level of unobserved ability, V . Moreover, we find that imposing separability
results in biases which are significant.
We estimate the model by local linear smoothing. Our estimator is a local
instrumental variables estimator built on the conventional two stage least squares
instrumental variables (IV) estimator, except that we let the coefficients depend
on the value of P(Z). It turns out that it is substantially easier to implement than
the estimator used for the additive model.3
Our results indicate that returns of attending college relative to obtaining just
A-levels to be sizable. Moreover, we find evidence for heterogeneity of monetary
returns. They are lower for individuals who actually attend college as compared
to the returns for those who don’t. This can be traced back to both observable and
unobservable factors, and the interaction of the two. One finding is that returns
are increasing in the father’s years of education. Unlike other studies, we don’t
find clear cut evidence for sorting based on comparative or absolute advantage.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we embed our study into
the literature. The full characterization of the econometric model, the identifica-
tion result, and the proposed estimator are presented in Section 3.3. Section 3.4
contains the results from the empirical analysis. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Related Results
In this section, we briefly relate our model to the literature.4 Furthermore, we dis-
cuss aspects of modelling unobserved heterogeneity, and most importantly ability.
In our application, we model two types of ability. The first consists of math
and verbal ability test scores at the age of 7 and 11, which we include in our
3 First applications are Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2005), Carneiro and Lee (2005) and
Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2004) where the model is estimated using a double residual re-
gression involving several additional steps, see Robinson (1988).
4 The question of how to estimate the returns to schooling and college education, which is
closely related to the estimation of respective counterfactual wage levels, is one of the classical
questions in econometrics. For two excellent surveys of the literature on the returns to schooling
see Griliches (1977) and Card (2001). For an early survey on the returns to college education see
Solmon and Taubman (1973).
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set of covariates. The availability of this information is a key advantage of the
NCDS since in many other data sets, e.g. the Family Expenditure Survey, the
General Household Survey, or the Labor Force Survey, such precisely measured
information is not available. Blundell, Dearden, and Sianesi (2005, BDS in the
remainder) analyze the same data using OLS, IV, matching, and control function
techniques. In Section 3.4, we compare our estimates of average returns to the
ones of BDS.
The second type of ability is contained in V which enters both the wage and
the selection equation. In the statistics literature, V is sometimes referred to as
a confounding variable, see e.g. Fisher (1935, Ch. 7) and Yates (1937). For
simplicity, we refert to V as unobservable ability.
This is well in line with the economics literature, where the term “ability” is
often used in different contexts and with different meanings. Griliches (1977, p. 7)
defines it as “an unobserved latent variable that both drives people to get relatively
more schooling and earn more income, given schooling, and perhaps also enables
and motivates people to score better on various tests.” Along those lines, Taubman
and Wales (1972) and Taubman (1973) call it “mental ability” and Willis and
Rosen (1979) use the expression “talent”. On the other hand, Griliches (1977, p.
8) suggests that one could also interpret ability as “initial human capital”. More
broadly, Becker (1967) elaborates on whether there are several types of ability and
Willis and Rosen (1979, p. S29) note that ability is potentially multi factoral.
In fact, in our model, V is the projection of all unobservable factors that are
common to the wage and the selection equation onto a scalar. Ashenfelter and
Mooney (1968), Griliches and Mason (1972), Hansen, Weisbrod, and Scanlon
(1970), Weisbrod and Karpoff (1968) and Leibowitz (1974) discuss and partly
analyze the link between ability as well as other factors and earnings in more de-
tail. Examples of such other factors include wealth, parent’s income, status, social
origin, motivation, quality of schooling, and idiosyncratic preferences. Here, we
reach a natural limitation of our data since not all of those factors are observable.
We proxy for some of these factors by including accurately measured family back-
ground variables, that are contained in the NCDS, in our set of covariates so that
only the remaining variation is captured by V if it is common to the wage and the
selection equation, and U if its only impact is on wages.
In general, econometric challenges arise from the fact that, via what we call
unobserved ability, V , the return to schooling and college education is likely to
be correlated with schooling and college choice once it results from optimizing
behavior by economic agents who act on their knowledge of their ability. This
gives rise to the classical selection problem in econometrics which could be over-
come relatively easily if a perfect measure of ability was available, for example by
including this measure into the set of regressors in the wage equation. Griliches
(1977) discusses econometric consequences when an imperfect measure is used,
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i.e. when ability is measured with error. Along these lines, Chamberlain (1977)
argues that it is instructive to think of unobserved ability as being a left-out vari-
able.
Early contributions discussing the selection problem in detail include Heck-
man (1978), Heckman and Robb (1985, 1986) and Willis and Rosen (1979). A
variety of approaches to this challenging problem has been taken over the last four
decades. Identifying assumptions include parametric assumptions, as well as con-
ditional (mean) independence and monotonicity in order to identify mean returns.
Also, quantile invariance has proved to be a powerful identifying assumption.5
Most of these approaches rely on the presence of IVs that can be excluded
from the earnings equation. IVs that have been used are quarter of birth (Angrist
and Krueger 1991) and parental interest in education (BDS) as well as, e.g., the
level of tuition fees, distance to college, and parental education, see Card (2001)
for details. Angrist and Krueger (2001) advocate the use of natural experiments
such as institutional changes as instruments giving rise to variation exogenous to
the earnings equation. In our application, we derive additional identifying power
from the assumption that the father’s interest in the education of the child can be
excluded from the wage equation.
The approach we take in this paper has several key advantages. First, we
do not restrict selection to be based solely on observables which underlies OLS
regressions, classical IV estimation, the random coefficient model suggested by
Heckman and Vytlacil (1998), and matching.6 Second, we do not have to spec-
5 For distributional assumptions see, e.g., Heckman (1978), and Aakvik, Heckman, and Vytlacil
(2005). Conditional independence is assumed in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Heckman and
Vytlacil (1998) exploit additivity of the error term in a random coefficient framework. Imbens and
Angrist (1994), Angrist, Graddy, and Imbens (2000), HV, Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2005),
Heckman and Vytlacil (2005), and Abadie, Angrist, and Imbens (2002) exploit monotonicity,
which is implied by the selection model. In Section 3.3, it will become clear that this is what we do
in this paper as well. Quantile invariance is relied on in Chernozhukov, Imbens, and Newey (2004)
and Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005). It is well beyond the scope of this paper to review the
literature. However, the reader is referred to, e.g. Blundell and Powell (2003) for the relationship
between IV and control function estimators, HV as well as Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) for the
relationship between estimators based on monotonicity and classical IV estimators and OLS, and
BDS for a comparison of OLS, IV, matching and control function estimators.
6 These models assume that conditional on observables, D is independent of either the effect
from changes in D, or the error term in the outcome equation, or both. Garen (1984), Heckman
(1978), Newey, Powell, and Vella (1999) as well as Pinske (2000) and Blundell and Powell (2003)
pursue a control function approach. Imbens and Newey (2003) generalize this approach. Newey
and Powell (2003), Darolles, Florens, and Renault (2003), and Das (2005) investigate the case in
which the error term is additive. Notice that in our case identification is complicated by the fact
that the endogenous variable is binary so that a control function approach in which we include
the first stage residual into the second stage is not feasible because the selection equation is not
invertible in V . It will become clear in Section 3.3 that the estimation step in our approach boils
down to estimation of the expected outcome conditional on D, X, and P(Z). Identification of the
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ify the joint distribution of unobservables which underlies parametric approaches.
Third, our model is nonparametric in the dimension of the unobserved heterogene-
ity since the dependence of the random coefficients on D and V is not constrained
by functional form assumptions. Forth, as we have already discussed in the in-
troduction, data requirements are weaker than in the fully nonparametric setup of
HV, and equal to the ones of the additive model of Carneiro, Heckman, and Vyt-
lacil (2005). At the same time, our model is more general in the sense that we
allow both the random coefficient and D to depend on V .
3.3 Econometric Approach
This section contains the formal results underlying our analysis in Section 3.4.
Our point of departure is the correlated random coefficients model that was given
in (3.1) and (3.2). We restate it for convenience:
Y = X′ϕ(D,U,V)(3.1)
D = 1I{P(Z) ≥ V}.(3.2)
(3.1) is the wage equation and (3.2) is the selection equation. We impose the
following stochastic restrictions.
A 1 (Stochastic Restrictions): (i) (U,V) are jointly independent of (X,Z)
and (ii) U is independent of V.
This allows Z to contain variables also included in X and vice versa. Assumption
1(i) requires the unobservables (U,V) to be jointly independent of the observables
(X,Z). This is considerably weaker than the IV type assumption that D is inde-
pendent of the unobservables in the outcome equation conditional on Z and X.
Assumption 1(ii) restricts the randomness in Y through U to be completely ran-
dom so that U represents luck, whereas V can be thought of as a confounding
factor.7
parameters of interest is achieved by exploiting the monotonicity implied by the selection model.
7 Assumption 1(ii) is not restrictive. ϕ(D,U,V) is a nonparametric function of the observable D
and unobservables (U,V). Therefore, it can at most be identified up to normalizations on the joint
distribution of unobservables. Assume that the joint distribution of unobservables is absolutely
continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure. Then, the restrictions on the joint distribution of
observables imposed by any joint distribution of (U˜, V˜) are the same as the ones imposed by the
joint distribution of (U,V), where v = FV˜ |U˜ (˜v) with V being uniformly distributed independently
of U. For example, we could have U = U˜ or any positive monotone transformation thereof. See
also Imbens and Newey (2003) for a related discussion.
40 Chapter 3. Nonadditive Models with Binary Endogenous Variables
Apart from the stochastic restrictions we assume that the following regularity
conditions hold.
A 2 (Regularity Conditions): (i) All rst moments exist and (ii) the dis-
tribution of V is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure.
Assumption 2(i) ensures that all parameters of interest are well defined. Assump-
tion 2(ii) implies that V is a continuous random variable. This allows us, w.l.o.g.,
to normalize V from now on to be uniformly distributed on the unit interval, see,
e.g., Vytlacil (2002) for details. From Assumption 1(i) it follows immediately
that P(Z) is identified from observations since it is equal to Pr(D = 1|Z). For
simplicity, we will write P for P(Z) in the remainder, with typical element p.
3.3.1 Parameters of Interest
We have already argued in the introduction that the CASF,
E[Y |D = d, X = x,V = v] = x′E[ϕ(d,U, v)]
is of special interest in our application. The terminology we use was introduced
by Blundell and Powell (2003) who suggest to focus on the average structural
function, E[Y |D = d, X = x]. Likewise, Imbens and Newey (2003) call it the av-
erage conditional response. Following Goldberger (1972), who calls an equation
structural if it represents a causal link rather than a mere empirical association,
we prefer to think of the wage equation as a structural equation. We believe that
for a given D and X the dependence of the average structural function on V is of
central economic interest by itself and hence focus on the average conditional on
V .
A second object of interest that is related to the CASF is the conditional aver-
age ceteris paribus effect of changes in Xk, e.g. the type of secondary school that
was attended or the social class of the father, for a given D, X−k, and V ,8
∂E[Y |D = d, X = x,V = v]
∂xk
= E[ϕk(d,U, v)].
Moreover, we are interested in the expected ceteris paribus effect of changes in D
for a given X and V ,
E[Y |D = 1, X = x,V = v] − E[Y |D = 0, X = x,V = v]
=x′
(
E[ϕ(1,U, v)] − E[ϕ(0,U, v)]
)
.
8 The kth element of a vector x is denoted by xk. The remaining elements are denoted by x−k.
For discrete Xk the partial derivative is replaced by an appropriate difference.
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This is Björklund and Moffit’s (1987) marginal treatment effect. It is the expected
effect of a college degree on wages for a given level of unobserved ability and for
a given vector of covariates. The well-known average treatment effect, averaged
over the population distribution of unobserved ability, for a given X = x is given
by
(3.3) x′
∫ 1
0
(
E[ϕ(1,U, v)] − E[ϕ(0,U, v)]
)dv,
recalling that we have normalized V to be uniformly distributed.
3.3.2 Identification
In this subsection, we show identification of the CASF at a given D, X, and V
under Assumption 1 and 2. The estimator we implement, which is built on local
linear smoothing, is proposed thereafter.
Because of the multiplicative structure of the wage equation, identification of
the CASF at D = d, V = v, and any X = x is equivalent to identification of the
conditional average ceteris paribus effects. The average structural function as well
as average ceteris paribus effects are identified at D = d if the CASF is identified
at all V in the open unit interval, recalling that we have normalized its distribution
to be uniformly distributed and that the endpoints have probability measure zero.
Finally, if the (conditional) average structural function is identified at both D = 0
and D = 1, the average (marginal) treatment effect is as well.
From the model in (3.1), it follows that
(3.4) E[Y |D = 1, P = p, X = x] = x′E[ϕ(1,U,V)|D = 1, P = p, X = x]
which is equal to
x′E[ϕ(1,U,V)|P ≥ V, P = p, X = x]
by the selection model in (3.2). But this is
x′E[ϕ(1,U,V)|X = x, p ≥ V].
By Assumption 1(i) we get that this is equal to
E[x′ϕ(1,U,V)|p ≥ V] = x′E[ϕ(1,U,V)|p ≥ V] =: x′β(1, p).
Note that E[ϕ(1,U,V)|p ≥ V] is a function of p which we will denote by β(1, p)
in the remainder. Since the left hand side of (3.4) is identified from observations
at points of support X = x and P = p, β(1, p) is identified if we observe at least
K linearly independent values of X for D = 1 (rank condition). β(0, p) is defined
accordingly and a similar result holds for D = 0.
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Starting from this, we show that the CASF is identified. We state the result in
a theorem which resembles Lemma 1 from Carneiro and Lee (2005). Following
HV, they show nonparametric identification under weaker stochastic restrictions
than the ones in Assumption 1, at the price of stronger support conditions that
need to hold for their result. Only when they estimate the model they impose the
restrictions in Assumption 1. We show the proof for two reasons. First, strictly
speaking, our identification result is not implied by their Lemma 1, even though
their proof is similar to ours. Second, our rank condition differs from theirs.
We call p a limit point of the support of P, if P has a continuous density in
a neighborhood around p which is bounded away from zero. Note that at P = p
derivatives of differentiable functions of P are identified from observations.
T 3 (Identification): Assume that β(0, p) and β(1, p) are continuously dif-
ferentiable with respect to p and that we observe at least K linearly independent
realizations of X for every D and P = p (rank condition). Then, under Assump-
tions 1 and 2 the CASF is identied at V = p, where p is a limit point of the
support of P, and given by
x′E[ϕ(0,U, p)] = x′
(
β(0, p) − (1 − p)
∂β(0, p)
∂p
)
x′E[ϕ(1,U, p)] = x′
(
β(1, p) + p
∂β(1, p)
∂p
)
.
Proof. We prove identification of E[ϕ(D,U,V)|D = 1,V = p]. The proof for
E[ϕ(D,U,V)|D = 0,V = p] is similar. Recall that we have normalized V to be
uniformly distributed. By definition,
x′E[ϕ(1,U,V)|p ≥ V] = x′β(1, p).
From the normalization on V and Assumption 1(ii) it follows that
(3.5) x′
∫ p
0
∫ ∞
−∞
ϕ(1, u, v) µ(du) dv/p = x′β(1, p),
where µ(du) is the marginal probability measure of u. Multiplying both sides by
p gives
x′
∫ p
0
∫ ∞
−∞
ϕ(1, u, v) µ(du) dv = x′β(1, p)p
and differentiating both sides with respect to p using Leibnitz’ rule reveals that
x′
∫ ∞
−∞
ϕ(1, u, p) µ(du) = x′β(1, p) + px′∂β(1, p)
∂p
.
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If p is a limit point of the support of P both β(1, p) and ∂β(1, p)/∂p are identified
from observations at P = p. The left hand side is the object of interest. 
Finally, notice that the proof relies on the monotonicity of D in P implied by
the selection model which allows us to formulate (3.5). See also Klein (2006) for
a discussion and an analysis of the case in which monotonicity does not hold, but
is wrongly assumed.
3.3.3 Estimation
We have established in our discussion that from the model and the conditions of
Theorem 1 it follows that
E[Y |D = d, P = p, X = x] = x′β(d, p) , d ∈ {0, 1},
where β(d, p) is a coefficient vector with coefficient functions βk(d, p), k = 1, . . . ,K.
Both depend on the observable D, and P which is identified from observations.
This is a version of the varying coefficient model which was suggested by Cleve-
land, Grosse, and Shyu (1991) and Hastie and Tibshirani (1993).
In a first step, we parametrically estimate P. For the second step we assume
that the coefficient functions are bounded and have bounded second derivatives
which allows us to estimate them by local linear smoothing. See, for example
Fan and Zhang (1999) and Xia and Li (1999) for details as well as a proof of
consistency and results on rates of convergence of the estimator. This estimation
procedure is usually motivated by a Taylor expansion of the coefficient function
in p˜ about p˜ = p which yields
βk(d, p˜) = βk(d, p) +
∂βk(d, p)
∂p
(p˜ − p) +
1
2
∂2βk(d, p¯)
∂p2
(p˜ − p)2,
where p¯ is a point between p and p˜. We select all observations with D = d and
index them by i, i = 1, . . . , n. Our estimator of β(d, p) and ∂β(d, p)/∂p is the
solution of a and b to the following minimizer
arg min
a,b

n∑
i=1
K
( pi − p
h
)
·
(
yi −
[
xi
(pi − p) · xi
]′ (
a
b
))2 ,
where K(·) is a kernel function with the usual properties and h is the bandwidth.
Since fitted values pi were parametrically estimated in a first step we do not expect
them to have an impact on the distribution of the second step estimator in a first
order asymptotic sense. However, we obtain confidence intervals, accounting for
the first step estimation error, using a bootstrap procedure.
Estimates of the objects of interest can be obtained from these estimates of
β(d, p) and ∂β(d, p)/∂p using the formulas from Theorem 1.
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3.4 College Education and Wages in the U.K.
3.4.1 Data
We implement the estimation procedure which was proposed in Section 3.3 for
U.K. data from the NCDS. The NCDS is conducted by the Centre for Longitudi-
nal Studies at the Institute of Education in London. It is a longitudinal data set and
keeps detailed records for all those living in Great Britain who were born between
March 3 and 9, 1958. The data were collected in 1958, in 1965 (when members
were aged 7 years), in 1969 (age 11), in 1974 (age 16), in 1981 (age 23), in 1991
(age 33) and 1999-2000 (age 41-42). The NCDS has gathered data from respon-
dents on child development from birth to early adolescence, child care, medical
care, health, physical statistics, school readiness, home environment, educational
progress, parental involvement, cognitive and social growth, family relationships,
economic activity, income, training, and housing.
Recently, BDS study these data using IV estimation, a control function esti-
mator, and matching techniques. For a more detailed data description and variable
definitions the reader is referred to their paper.
Their, as well as our, outcome of interest is log hourly wages in 1991, this is
at the age of 33. We select individuals who at least completed their A levels, from
which 51.4% are higher education graduates. We say that an individual completes
his A levels if he completed at least one A level which is generally obtained at the
end of secondary school, see BDS for details. Notably, we distinguish between
college graduates (D = 1), who have completed some kind of higher education,
and those who have obtained A levels only (D = 0). We focus on employed males
and select individuals with non-missing verbal and math ability test scores. This
leaves us with 1501 observations.
The NCDS contains a host of accurately measured variables including infor-
mation about the type of secondary school that was attended and a number of
family background variables. In the U.K., secondary school is attended from the
age of 11 to 12 on for 7 years. The individuals in our sample were born in 1958 so
that they entered secondary school in the late 1960s. At that time the public school
system was changing. Until then, there were two basic types of public secondary
schools in the U.K., Secondary modern and Grammar schools. Secondary modern
schools were intended for children who would be going into a trade and focussed
on practical skills. Grammar schools were intended to prepare pupils for higher
education. In the 1960s, comprehensive schools were promoted as an alternative
and started to partly replace the old system providing complete and general educa-
tion. But in fact, which route was pursued for the school system highly depended
on the respective local authority. Nowadays, there is a mixture of types of public
schools. Alongside public schools there are prestigious Private schools such as
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no college (49%) college (51%)
mean std. mean std.
       33 2.04 0.40 2.32 0.37
’            7
expects too much 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.17
very interested 0.28 0.45 0.43 0.50
some interest 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.42
’            7
expects too much 0.03 0.17 0.05 0.21
very interested 0.38 0.49 0.56 0.50
some interest 0.44 0.50 0.31 0.46
 
math ability at 7 55.17 23.97 66.40 21.53
math ability at 11 57.39 16.06 67.25 14.26
verbal ability at 7 80.15 20.74 90.45 13.32
verbal ability at 11 59.52 20.52 72.05 16.98
  
Secondary Modern 0.15 0.36 0.09 0.29
Comprehensive school 0.52 0.50 0.42 0.49
Grammar 0.08 0.28 0.21 0.41
Private 0.04 0.20 0.10 0.29
other 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.11
missing school information 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.37
    
professional 0.03 0.17 0.10 0.30
intermediate 0.16 0.37 0.23 0.42
skilled non-manual 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29
skilled manual 0.34 0.48 0.25 0.44
semi-skilled non-manual 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.07
semi-skilled manual 0.09 0.29 0.06 0.23
unskilled 0.19 0.39 0.18 0.39
missing/unemployed/no father 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.28
       16
father’s years of education 7.84 4.32 8.35 5.11
missing 0.21 0.41 0.23 0.42
mother’s years of education 8.04 4.17 8.20 4.65
missing 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.41
father’s age 44.17 11.69 45.06 10.89
missing 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.19
mother’s age 42.41 8.76 42.75 8.83
missing 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16
mother was employed 0.58 0.49 0.55 0.50
number of siblings 1.70 1.57 1.47 1.41
     16
North Western 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30
North 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27
East and West Riding 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25
North Midlands 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.25
Eastern 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.28
London and South East 0.14 0.34 0.14 0.35
Southern 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.25
South Western 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.25
Midlands 0.09 0.28 0.07 0.26
Wales 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.23
other 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39
Tab. 3.1: Summary Statistics.
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Eton college, which are sometimes still referred to as “public schools” since they
are open for the paying public as opposed to a religious school.9
In our analysis we proxy social class by the type of occupation of the father
when the child was 16. Categories are professional, intermediate, skilled and
semi-skilled non-manual as well as skilled or semi-skilled manual, and unskilled.
Table 3.1 contains summary statistics for our data. Notably, wages are higher
for college graduates, and as compared to college non-graduates more college
graduates (i) went to Grammar or Private school, (ii) have a father who is profes-
sional or intermediate, and (iii) have better educated parents on average.
3.4.2 First Stage Estimates
The first stage of our two stage estimator consists of fitting values of P by estimat-
ing a probit model. Our set of variables in the selection equation, Z, consists of the
parent’s interest in the education of the child, math and reading ability test scores
at the age of 7 and 11, indicator variables for secondary school type, the father’s
social class when the child was 16, as well as other family background variables
and, in some specifications, region. As was shown in Section 3.3. an exclusion
restriction is not needed for identification of the CASF in our model—unlike for
nonparametric identification as in HV.
Note that whereas the interpretation of the estimated probit coefficients as ce-
teris paribus effects heavily relies on the distributional assumptions in a probit
model, the fitted values of the propensity score are less sensitive to violations of
those assumptions once we interpret the usual probit model as a reduced form.10
As suggested by the literature, and in order to undertake a sensitivity analysis, we
estimated these fitted values by ordinary least squares, see Kelejian (1971) and the
discussion in Angrist and Krueger (2001). However, our results did not change
qualitatively.
Table 3.2 contains coefficient estimates for 5 different specifications. Through-
out, the direction of the impact is as expected and in line with the literature which
takes a closer look at the channels though which parents’ education is transmit-
ted to the children, see Goldberger (1989) and Haveman and Wolfe (1995) for an
overview and discussions. Column (1) is the full specification in which indicator
variables for region were included. Column (2) is the same specification except
that secondary school type was left out because it could arguably be endogenous.
This is the case whenever conditional on measured ability and all other controls
in Z, those who know already that they will be more likely to go to college attain
9 See, e.g., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Education in the United Kingdom (February 2006).
10 Willis and Rosen (1979) invoke a set of assumptions which allows them to estimate both a
reduced form and a structural probit.
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Fig. 3.1: Sample distribution of the propensity score conditional on D.
a special kind of secondary school, e.g. Grammar school. The remaining coeffi-
cients are largely unchanged. In the first two specifications, the region indicator
variables were all insignificant. Column (3) and (4) contain estimates obtained
from the specification in (1) and (2), respectively, except that these indicator vari-
ables were left out. Again, in comparison to the first two columns, the estimates
remained largely unchanged. For our final specification in column (5) we left out
the mother’s interest in the education of the child since it is highly correlated with
father’s interest.
Moreover, we left out some of the insignificant indicator variables for sec-
ondary school type, social class and family background. Our estimates show
throughout that parents’ interest has a significant impact on the probability of
attending college, so do the ability measures, whether the child went to Grammar
school, and whether the father is professional.
Figure 3.1 shows the the sample distributions of the fitted values of P. For both
D = 0 and D = 1 the support is almost equal to the full unit interval. Note that the
distributions differ between D = 0 and D = 1. This shows that the variables in Z
have explanatory power.
3.4.3 Second Stage Implementation
In the second stage, drawing on Section 3.3’s results we estimate the mean coef-
ficient functions, β(d, p) and their derivatives with respect to p. For smoothing
in the direction of p we use an Epanechnikov kernel and estimated the coeffi-
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
coeff. t-stat. coeff. t-stat. coeff. t-stat. coeff. t-stat. coeff. t-stat.
’       
expects too much 1.12 3.09 1.11 3.11 1.13 3.15 1.13 3.18 1.23 3.72
very interested 0.13 1.16 0.12 1.10 0.12 1.11 0.11 1.04 0.27 3.17
some interest 0.26 2.73 0.25 2.61 0.26 2.68 0.24 2.57 0.22 2.47
’       
expects too much 0.16 0.70 0.15 0.65 0.17 0.74 0.15 0.69
very interested 0.20 1.44 0.21 1.57 0.22 1.59 0.23 1.70
some interest -0.02 -0.13 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.05
 
math ability at 7 0.00 1.90 0.00 2.17 0.00 1.98 0.00 2.28 0.00 2.24
math ability at 11 0.01 3.83 0.01 3.87 0.01 3.86 0.01 3.93 0.01 3.79
verbal ability at 7 0.01 3.97 0.01 4.16 0.01 4.01 0.01 4.15 0.01 4.04
verbal ability at 11 0.00 1.36 0.00 1.63 0.00 1.28 0.00 1.55 0.00 1.19
     C 
Secondary Modern 0.01 0.09 0.00 -0.02
Grammar 0.27 2.32 0.27 2.36 0.29 2.71
Private 0.11 0.71 0.11 0.72 0.12 0.78
other -0.33 -1.17 -0.32 -1.15
missing school information -0.07 -0.59 -0.07 -0.59
       
professional 0.57 2.63 0.62 2.84 0.58 2.65 0.62 2.86 0.45 2.56
intermediate 0.17 1.06 0.22 1.37 0.18 1.09 0.23 1.41 0.04 0.45
skilled non-manual 0.13 0.72 0.14 0.80 0.14 0.75 0.15 0.83
skilled manual 0.16 1.05 0.17 1.09 0.16 1.06 0.17 1.10
semi-skilled non-manual -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.13
semi-skilled manual 0.14 0.75 0.14 0.72 0.15 0.78 0.14 0.76
missing/unemployed/no father 0.14 0.63 0.04 0.23 0.07 0.37 -0.05 -0.31
       16
father’s years of education 0.02 0.39 0.02 0.37 0.02 0.38 0.02 0.37 0.03 1.42
missing 0.79 2.12 0.83 2.26 0.78 2.11 0.83 2.26 0.36 1.45
mother’s years of education 0.03 0.48 0.03 0.53 0.02 0.41 0.02 0.45
missing -0.47 -1.21 -0.43 -1.11 -0.48 -1.25 -0.44 -1.15
father’s age 0.00 -0.10 0.00 -0.11 0.00 -0.21 0.00 -0.22
missing -0.49 -0.95 -0.48 -0.94 -0.55 -1.07 -0.54 -1.06
mother’s age 0.02 1.19 0.01 1.11 0.02 1.23 0.01 1.14
missing 0.97 1.68 0.93 1.62 0.99 1.74 0.96 1.68
mother was employed -0.09 -1.04 -0.09 -1.08 -0.09 -1.05 -0.09 -1.06 -0.08 -1.00
number of siblings -0.04 -1.58 -0.04 -1.56 -0.05 -1.60 -0.04 -1.59 -0.04 -1.48
interaction father’s education x age 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.75
interaction mother’s education x age 0.00 -0.98 0.00 -0.99 0.00 -0.94 0.00 -0.93
     16
indicator variables yes yes no no no
 -3.34 -5.69 -3.48 -6.03 -3.21 -5.62 -3.32 -5.94 -2.59 -8.40
McFadden R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13
Tab. 3.2: First stage probit coefficient estimates.
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estimate 95% conf. int.
ATE population 0.46 0.04 0.89
ATE treated 0.26 -0.11 0.64
ATE untreated 0.63 0.03 1.22
OLS 0.21 0.17 0.25
IV 0.43 0.09 0.75
BDS 0.24 0.21 0.28
additive 0.40 0.05 0.74
Tab. 3.3: Comparison of the estimated average treatment effect (ATE) for different sub-
populations to OLS and IV estimates as well as the BDS matching estimates,
and the additive model of Carneiro and Lee (2005).
cient vectors at 101 grid points between 0 and 1. As we have seen, this is a
one-dimensional nonparametric problem. The bandwidths were chosen using a
standard leave-one-out cross validation procedure. It turns out that the optimal
bandwidth for D = 0 is infinitely large, implying estimation of a fully interacted
model without any smoothing. For D = 1 the optimal bandwidth is 1.7. The
required rank conditions hold in our data, i.e. the weighted n × 2K matrix of
explanatory variables and interaction terms is of rank 2K at all evaluation points
p.
From these estimates, which we provide with hats in the remainder, we cal-
culate the vector of conditional average ceteris paribus effects for a given d and
v, Ê[ϕ(d,U, v)], and the CASF, x′Ê[ϕ(d,U, v)] as well as other identifiable fea-
tures of interest. In our bootstrap procedure for respective confidence intervals we
acknowledge the fact that the propensity score is estimated in a first step by esti-
mating it within every one of 1,000 bootstrap replications. For illustration, Figure
3.2 in the appendix contains estimates of the CASF and the marginal treatment
effect for a representative individual with median characteristics. In particular,
this representative individual went to comprehensive school, its father has 9 years
of education and is neither professional nor intermediate, his mother is employed,
and he has 1 sibling. Next, we go though the results in detail.
3.4.4 Average Returns to College Education
We calculate average returns using (3.3), replacing x by respective population
means. For the average treatment effect on the untreated and treated, we simulate
the distribution of V conditional on D by exploiting the structure of the selection
model. For example, if we observe an individual with D = 0 and P = p, we would
draw values of V from a uniform distribution on (p, 1]. Respective confidence
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intervals account for the simulation error. In Table 3.3, we compare our estimates
to estimates obtained from an OLS regression, two stage IV estimates, as well
as matching estimates obtained by BDS. The OLS estimate can be interpreted
as the average difference in earnings observed in the population once we control
for differences in covariates. This observed difference in earnings can be traced
back to a selection effect and a causal effect of a higher education degree. Not
surprisingly, the OLS estimate is very close to the matching estimate of BDS
since matching is built on the assumption that conditional on observables, D is
independent of the error term in the outcome equation. As covariates in the wage
equation we used the variables from the final specification in Table 3.2, except for
the father’s interest in the education of the child.
Commonly, the linear IV estimate is interpreted as estimating the average
treatment effect of those who are induced to attend college by the variables that
are excluded from the outcome equation, see, e.g. the discussion in BDS and Im-
bens and Angrist (1994) as well as Card (2001). In our specification, following
BDS, we have excluded the father’s interest in the education of the child from the
outcome equation. The estimate obtained from the additive model is close to our
estimate for the population.
Notably, we estimate the average treatment effect to be lower for those who
actually attend college. This difference can partly be explained by differences in
observables since the average treatment effect depends on those observables in our
model.
In general, all estimates which are obtained from a two stage (ours, OLS, IV,
additive) procedure are relatively imprecise. We suppose that this is due to the
first stage estimation error which is carried over into the second stage.
3.4.5 Average Ceteris Paribus Effects
Panel (1) in Table 3.4 contains estimates of average ceteris paribus effects and
respective 95% confidence intervals. The set of covariates we included into the
second step is the same as the one in the final specification for the first step, ex-
cept that we leave out the father’s interest in the education of the child. We also
calculated estimates for alternative specifications, but the results did not change
qualitatively.
The top rows contain estimates for D = 0 and the bottom rows for D = 1.
Statistically significant determinants of wages are whether the father was profes-
sional, which resulted in a large wage increase both for D = 0 and even more so
for D = 1 and the father’s years of education, but only for D = 0. In general, our
estimates were quite imprecise. Yet, as we have already seen above, this is also
the case for the standard linear IV estimates. Therefore, we feel that this lack of
precision is not a property of our estimation procedure, but a feature of our data.
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(1) (2) (3)
average ceteris test for unobserved bias in estimates
paribus effect heterogeneity when additivity is imposed
estimate 95% conf. int. est. slope 95% conf. int. bias 95% conf. int.
NO COLLEGE DEGREE
 
math ability at 7 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.000 -0.008 0.009 0.000 -0.002 0.002
math ability at 11 0.002 -0.002 0.006 0.000 -0.014 0.016 0.000 -0.006 0.003
verbal ability at 7 0.003 -0.002 0.007 0.007 -0.007 0.018 -0.002 -0.006 0.002
verbal ability at 11 0.000 -0.004 0.003 -0.001 -0.014 0.012 0.000 -0.005 0.002
     C 
Grammar 0.021 -0.230 0.275 0.099 -1.063 1.267 -0.003 -0.293 0.210
Private 0.159 -0.099 0.418 0.040 -1.260 1.295 -0.026 -0.362 0.158
       
professional 0.293 0.007 0.757 -1.662 -3.386 -0.245 -0.316 -0.663 0.095
intermediate -0.022 -0.116 0.087 -0.224 -0.680 0.257 0.017 -0.130 0.074
       16
father’s years of education 0.034 0.007 0.064 -0.008 -0.145 0.114 -0.010 -0.041 0.016
missing 0.331 0.053 0.660 0.062 -1.305 1.358 -0.109 -0.441 0.165
mother was employed 0.023 -0.053 0.119 0.007 -0.328 0.426 -0.003 -0.035 0.137
number of siblings -0.019 -0.053 0.011 -0.022 -0.126 0.084 0.006 -0.016 0.048
 1.269 0.566 2.014 -0.318 -1.970 1.368 0.253 -0.542 0.901
COLLEGE DEGREE
 
math ability at 7 -0.002 -0.010 0.005 -0.003 -0.011 0.006 0.003 -0.004 0.012
math ability at 11 0.004 -0.010 0.015 0.002 -0.012 0.015 -0.003 -0.014 0.012
verbal ability at 7 -0.011 -0.024 0.004 -0.010 -0.022 0.003 0.010 -0.004 0.024
verbal ability at 11 -0.013 -0.024 0.000 -0.014 -0.025 0.000 0.013 -0.003 0.021
     C 
Grammar 0.238 -0.396 0.758 0.303 -0.464 0.932 -0.259 -0.752 0.399
Private 0.528 -0.079 1.139 0.569 -0.197 1.331 -0.435 -1.048 0.170
       
professional 0.794 0.054 1.540 1.035 0.080 2.090 -0.823 -1.611 -0.130
intermediate 0.174 -0.286 0.633 0.152 -0.364 0.686 -0.188 -0.721 0.200
       16
father’s years of education -0.006 -0.093 0.063 -0.014 -0.124 0.071 0.015 -0.046 0.110
missing 0.108 -0.873 0.911 0.006 -1.161 0.943 -0.012 -0.692 1.077
mother was employed -0.001 -0.277 0.298 -0.075 -0.374 0.269 0.033 -0.253 0.323
number of siblings -0.017 -0.123 0.074 0.003 -0.108 0.102 -0.004 -0.071 0.126
 4.126 2.578 5.583 1.998 0.474 3.147 -2.078 -3.821 -0.773
Tab. 3.4: Average ceteris paribus effects, test for unobserved heterogeneity, and estimates for the bias from imposing additivity.
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Panel (2) contains the result of a test for unobserved heterogeneity. We say
that unobserved heterogeneity is present whenever the impact of a component of
X, including the constant, depends on V . Therefore, the null hypothesis is that
the derivative of the conditional average ceteris paribus effect with respect to V
is zero at all V = v. This implies that the linear approximation to the slope is
zero. (2) contains estimated linear approximations to the slope of Ê[ϕ(d,U, v)], as
well as bootstrapped confidence intervals. Notice that here, we face two sources
of estimation error. First, the error that stems from estimating the conditional av-
erage ceteris paribus effect itself and second, the error from estimating the linear
approximation to its slope. The presence of essential heterogeneity is significant
at the 5% level if 0 lies outside the confidence interval. Using this test, we find
evidence for essential heterogeneity in the impact of the father being professional
for both D = 0 and D = 1 and overall for D = 1, via the constant term.11
This essential heterogeneity has the interpretation of a nonseparability be-
tween the effect of X and V on Y . It is a key advantage of the techniques developed
in this paper to allow us to control for this nonseparability. In panel (3), we raise
the question whether imposing the absence of this nonseparability, i.e. impos-
ing the additive model of Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2005) and Carneiro
and Lee (2005), results in biases of average ceteris paribus effects. We report
estimates of the bias that results from imposing separability. The estimates were
obtained by comparing our estimator to a simple series estimator of the additive
model Y = µ(D,U,V) + X′
−1β(D,U) in which the effect of X on Y is not allowed
to depend on V . A cross validation yields that only a linear term in P should
be included into the regression of Y on X conditional on D in order to calculate
estimates of average ceteris paribus effects. Clearly, this proceeding is far less
elaborate than the double-residual regression procedure that is carried out in, e.g.,
Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2005) and Carneiro and Lee (2005). Therefore,
we prefer to interpret our estimates of the biases only as rough estimates or first
approximations. However, the results in panel (2) indicate already that the addi-
tive model is misspecified for our data so that it is not surprising that we estimate
the bias to be significant for the impact of the father being professional and the
constant term for D = 1.
3.4.6 Conditional Average Ceteris Paribus Effects and Sorting
Figure 3.3 and 3.4 in the Appendix contain estimates of conditional average ce-
teris paribus effects. They show the respective dependence of the impact of co-
11 Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2005) and Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2004) suggest
to test for essential heterogeneity by checking whether the expected value of wages given P and X
is linear in P by fitting polynomials to the data. Using this test, we were not able to reject the null
of no essential heterogeneity for our data.
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fraction 95% conf. int.
level, D = 0 0.62 0.04 0.93
level, D = 1 0.65 0.32 0.96
marginal treatment effect 0.54 0.47 0.60
Tab. 3.5: Fractions of observations for which the CASF (level) and the marginal treatment
effect is increasing in V . Linear approximations to the slope were calculated.
variates on wages as a function of D and V . Notice that according to the selection
model low values of V induce individuals to attend college so that we should
think of low values of V as representing high unobservable ability. For exam-
ple, whereas the impact of the father being professional on wages is increasing in
unobservable ability for D = 0, it is decreasing for D = 1.
Since X varies across individuals, it is helpful to take a closer look at the de-
pendence of the marginal treatment effect on V when X varies across individuals.
Carneiro and Lee (2004, footnote 3) point out that individuals base their selection
into educational on their comparative advantage with respect to monetary benefits
if the marginal treatment effect is higher for those individuals who go to college,
i.e. if the marginal treatment effect is falling in V conditional on observables X.12
Variation in covariates induces variation in the slope of the marginal treatment ef-
fect. Therefore, we estimated a linear approximation to the slope of the marginal
treatment effect for every individual.
Table 3.5 contains the fractions of the population for which, respectively, the
slope of the CASF and the marginal treatment effect are positive. In order to obtain
those numbers, linear approximations to the slope were estimated. The numbers
indicate that the way wages depend on what we labelled unobserved ability, V , is
nontrivial.
As for the slope of the levels, the slope is positive in about 60 per cent of the
cases. A positive slope implies that
x′E[ϕ(0,U,V)|D = 1] < x′E[ϕ(0,U,V)|D = 0]
x′E[ϕ(1,U,V)|D = 1] < x′E[ϕ(1,U,V)|D = 0].
Hence, the numbers indicate that in about 60 per cent of the cases those who
actually graduated from college earn less compared to what those, who did not
12 See, e.g., Roy (1951) for the impact of selection of individuals based on their comparative
advantage on the income distribution, Sattinger (1978) for an empirical study of respective com-
parative advantages of individuals in the performance of tasks, Willis and Rosen (1979) for a
parametric study of the returns to college education in the presence of such selection, as well as
Carneiro and Lee (2004) for a semiparametric analysis. Heckman and Sedlacek (1985, 1990)
develop models of the sectoral allocation of workers based on comparative advantage.
54 Chapter 3. Nonadditive Models with Binary Endogenous Variables
graduate from college, would earn, had they been forced to do so. Conversely,
those who did not go to college earn more than those who did go to college would
have earned, had they been prevented from doing so. This is in line with our ear-
lier finding that treatment effects are higher for college non-graduates compared to
college graduates. However, notice that this is only an analysis of monetary bene-
fits, neglecting the costs of attending college which could have been prohibitively
high for those who did not in fact attend college.
Surprisingly, only for about 46 per cent of the individuals the slope of the mar-
ginal treatment effect is negative. Hence, the comparative advantage hypothesis is
only supported for these 46 per cent of the individuals. For about 54 per cent of
the individuals, the slope is positive. This is in contrast to the findings in previous
studies including Willis and Rosen (1979) and Carneiro and Lee (2004). One ex-
planation could be that both of these studies do not allow the effect of V on wages
to depend on X. In fact, as we have seen in Table 3.3, such estimates would be
biased for our data.
We shall end with the conjecture that the comparative advantage hypothesis,
which is a central concept in Economics, could well be reconciled with these find-
ings once nonmonetary costs and benefits are included in the analysis. Just to give
an example, it could well be that a college degree is associated with nonpecuniary
benefits such as the pleasure of being educated which represent an additional re-
turn that has not been focussed on in this study. Clearly, such nonmonetary costs
and benefits might again well be correlated with unobserved ability, family back-
ground, and social class. After all, we understand our results as evidence for
nontrivial sorting patterns that are not solely based on monetary considerations.
Therefore, we strongly believe that more research, and other data, are of need in
order to better understand the sorting patterns into educational levels.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have proposed and implemented a semiparametric estimator for
expected wage levels and their dependence on the endogenous schooling choice.
The virtue of our approach to the problem lies in dimensionality reduction
along the dimension of the usually higher dimensional vector of exogenous co-
variates. Moreover, we are able to circumvent the problem of limited support of
the propensity score given the vector of covariates since we require only condi-
tions on the unconditional support of P to hold. At the same time, we do not
impose any limiting restrictions on the joint distribution of unobservables.
The estimator we propose is a two step version of a local linear regression es-
timator. The usefulness of our approach was shown in turn of the empirical analy-
sis. In particular, our results suggest that differences in wages can be attributed
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to differences in observables in interaction with unobserved ability. In previous
studies, e.g. by Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2005) and Carneiro and Lee
(2005), this complementarity between observables and unobservables was largely
neglected for reasons of tractability. In this paper, we have suggested an estima-
tion procedure which does allow for such effects on the one hand and which is
easily implementable on the other.
The results of the empirical analysis are manyfold. First, we find that mea-
sured ability, social class, secondary school type, and family background have
explanatory power for the decision to attend college. Second, with an estimate of
0.46 for the population, we find the monetary return to college education to be siz-
able with returns for college graduates being lower than for college non-graduates.
Third, our estimates do not support the hypothesis of sorting into schooling based
on comparative advantage with respect to the monetary returns. Forth and last, we
find nonseparabilities between the impact of observables, e.g. whether the father
is professional, and unobserved ability on wages and show that biases arise once
an additive structure is imposed. We feel that this shows the usefulness of our
approach.
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Fig. 3.2: Point estimates and bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals of the conditional
average structural function (top) and the marginal treatment effect (bottom). Re-
ported for a representative individual with median characteristics.
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Fig. 3.3: Conditional average ceteris paribus effects 1/2. Point estimates and bootstrapped
95% confidence intervals.
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The secret. . . is to wait until the 90 day feedback period is nearly up
and then zap em w[ith a] negative feedback when they only have a few
hours remaining to respond. . . That way they can’t retaliate. . . This
only wor[ks] if you are able to hold a grudge for 90 days. . . —An
eBay user.1
4.1 Introduction
Feedback mechanisms in electronic markets allow partners to rate each other after
a transaction. These schemes, also referred to as “reputation mechanisms,” are
claimed to be crucial for the success of anonymous trading platforms such as
eBay.2 On these platforms the room for opportunistic behavior on both sides of
the market is particularly wide: anonymity and distance allow sellers to cheat
on the quality of the good. Likewise, buyers can be dishonest concerning their
payment behavior.3
In spite of the incentive to free ride—providing feedback appears a purely al-
truistic act prima facie—feedback is given in the better part of the transactions on
eBay.4 Therefore, it could be argued that this device plays an important role in
diminishing informational asymmetries by enhancing the discipline of transact-
ing parties. However, there is a lively discussion about the economic effects of
reputation mechanisms in electronic markets.5
Rather than focusing on the effects of reputation, for example on prices or the
1 Quote taken from a newsgroup discussion on
http://www.the-gas-station.com/messages.cfm? type=normal&thread_id=49933&lastdays=2000&
(February 2006).
2 For example, in the founder’s letter posted on February 26, 1996, Pierre Omidyar claims that
“some people are dishonest. Or deceptive. . . But here, those people can’t hide. We’ll drive them
away.” See http://pages.ebay.com/services/forum/feedback-foundersnote.html (February 2006).
3 According to the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) 2004 Internet Fraud Crime Report
“internet auction fraud was by far the most reported offense, comprising 71.2% of 207, 449 re-
ferred complaints.” See http://www1.ifccfbi.gov/strategy/statistics.asp (July 2005). Likewise,
the FTC reports that “internet auction fraud is on the rise, with an increasing number of con-
sumers complaining about sellers who deliver their advertised goods late or not at all, or de-
liver something far less valuable than promised.” See the FTC’s “Top Ten Dot Cons” on
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/edcams/dotcon/auction.htm (February 2006).
4 Resnick and Zeckhauser (2001) were among the first to investigate feedback behavior on
eBay. They find that in about 52 per cent of the transactions feedback is left.
5 See Dellarocas (2005) for a useful survey of recent research on reputation mechanisms. The
effects of seller reputation on prices and the probability of selling the object are usually found to
be negligible or positive. See, for example, Melnik and Alm (2002), Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003),
Cabral and Hortaçsu (2005), Livingston and Evans (2004), Lucking-Reiley, Bryan, Prasad, and
Reeves (2005), Houser and Wooders (forthcoming). See also Bajari and Hortaçsu (2004) as well
as Resnick, Zeckhauser, Swanson, and Lockwood (2004) for an overview.
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probability of selling, we focus on the occurrence and timing of feedbacks. In
particular, we document an asymmetry in the feedback behavior previously un-
noted in the literature, propose an explanation based on the micro structure of the
eBay feedback mechanism, and support this explanation by findings from a large
data set. Our analysis implies that the informational content of feedback records
is possibly rather low. This is often neglected by eBay users.6
On eBay, both the seller and the buyer of an object are allowed to rate each
other after a transaction. Mostly, feedbacks are positive. Moreover, it is well
known that the correlation between first and second feedbacks is very high. We
argue that this is at least partly driven by expectations on feedback reciprocity,
i.e. giving a positive feedback while expecting the trading partner to reciprocate.7
In contrast, and surprisingly, incidences of feedback retaliation, i.e. reacting to a
negative feedback with a negative, are relatively rare in the data. In most cases,
the second feedback is missing. In particular, in our data, we find that about 71
per cent of the positive feedbacks are reciprocated, whereas only about 37 per cent
of the negative feedbacks are retaliated.
Feedback behavior can be influenced by several forces including the outcome
of the transaction and strategic considerations. Public statements by eBay em-
phasize the ability of the feedback mechanism to discipline transacting parties by
informing potential future trading partners about their current conduct.8 Truthful
reporting, however, may be in conflict with strategic feedback behavior which is
present whenever agents anticipate the opponents’ reactions when giving feed-
back. The following newsgroup discussion contains interesting insights of some
eBay users. Its title is “Fix some eBay problems” and the contributions show that
users are well aware of feedback retaliation.9 One buyer reports
Just last week, I had my first unpleasant experience in five years of
eBay’ing. I received an item from a seller who had not left feedback
for me (I mailed my money order the day after the auction ended). I
was not happy with the item - flaws were not disclosed in the listing -
and I notified the seller. After three e-mails and three phone calls went
unanswered, I left negative feedback for her. She turned around and
6 Jin and Kato (2002) find in a field experiment that “at least some buyers” overestimate the
informational content of feedback score and “drastically underestimate the risk of trading online.”
Likewise, Resnick, Zeckhauser, Swanson, and Lockwood (2004) question whether price premia,
which they find, reflect a reputation equilibrium, and should in fact not be observed in the data.
7 Dellarocas, Fan, and Wood (2004) relate the motivation for leaving positive feedback to the
user’s expectation of reciprocal behavior from their trading partners.
8 eBay states that the feedback “comments and ratings are valuable indicators of your reputation
as a buyer or seller on eBay,” see http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/questions/feedback.html
(February 2006).
9 Quotes are taken from http://ideas.4brad.com/archives/000018.html (February 2006).
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posted retaliatory negative feedback for me ruining my 100% rating.
Indeed, the system needs to be improved.
Another user writes
In the past I’ve not left any neg[ative] feedback as I’m afraid of re-
venge feedback that’ll paint me as a bad trading partner. . . the dodgy
seller ends up with getting away with it just to rip someone else off.
Yet another user notes
As a buyer I have had problems with false item descriptions, even if
you get a refund . . . you end up paying postage for the item to you
and back. Up till now I have not left any feedback for these bastards
because of revenge.
and one concludes that
I have been basing my purchase decisions [on eBay] on sellers’ feed-
back scores. I had no idea these scores are so unreliable . . . They are
holding this feedback system out as the reason we should trust sell-
ers, but the system has little to no basis in truth . . . I suspect there are
many, many people out there who have had actual monetary losses
from this behavior.
This shows that at least some users are aware of possible feedback retaliation,
or “revenge.” Therefore, a reputation of being an imitator, who always reacts
strategically to a positive feedback with a positive reply, and to a negative feed-
back with a negative one, could be valuable because it encourages future partners
to give positive feedbacks, and discourages them from giving negative ones. eBay
even sells a service to sellers allowing them to automatically reciprocate positive
feedbacks.10 Such behavior is in principle observable to other users on eBay.11
Our explanation for the asymmetry between the likelihood of a positive feed-
back being reciprocated and a negative one being retaliated is based on the in-
stitutional rules for giving feedback, combined with agents’ expectations about
retaliation and the assumption of attention decreasing in time. We argue that if an
agent strategically anticipates the likely reaction of her counterpart and considers
giving a first positive feedback, she should give it as early as possible in order
to maximize the probability of a favorable reciprocation. Conversely, if an agent
10 The price for an online seller tool which includes this service is currently $15.99 a month, see
http://pages.ebay.com/sell/automation.html (February 2006) for a description.
11 In particular, the feedbacks a user gets and the replies she leaves can be inferred from her
feedback record.
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considers giving negative feedback first and is concerned with possible retalia-
tion, she should give the feedback as late as possible, i.e. she should opt for a last
minute feedback to minimize the time that is left for the counterpart to retaliate.
This explanation implies that agents dissatisfied with their trading partners an-
ticipate the risk of revenge, and may therefore be induced to refrain from leaving
negative feedbacks all together, reducing and biasing the informational content of
the reputation index towards positive outcomes. If agents who give the first feed-
back expect the opponent to reciprocate positive feedbacks, or retaliate negative
feedbacks, then one would expect negative first feedbacks to be rare and positive
ones to be common, a pattern that is usually found.12 This point is also confirmed
by a very recent study of Dellarocas and Wood (2006) showing that only about 86
per cent of eBay users are actually happy with the underlying transaction.
In order to support this explanation, we collected a large data set on eBay
auctions and the ensuing feedbacks. We find that feedback is given substantially
earlier if positive rather than neutral or negative. Moreover, our nonparametric
analysis reveals that the probability of the trading partner reacting to the feedback
is decreasing in the time the first feedback was given. It is interesting to see that
this is the case no matter whether the feedback was positive or negative. As pre-
dicted, the probability that a feedback is negative increases substantially towards
the last minute of the feedback period.
Towards refining our insights into the observed pattern, we look separately
at buyers and sellers, and the trading partners’ experience as well as at interac-
tion effects between role and experience. In particular, we find that experience
promotes strategic behavior. In the conclusion we propose simple changes in the
eBay feedback mechanism that could greatly reduce this form of strategic behav-
ior and improve its informational content.
In this work, we argue that giving negative feedback in the “last minute” and
positive feedbacks early is motivated by strategic considerations. “Last minute
bidding” in English auctions with fixed ending time (Roth and Ockenfels 2002)
is a similar phenomenon. In both cases last minute action is exploited in order
to prevent the opponents’ reaction to the revelation of private information. How-
ever, if one were to consider mechanisms without fixed ending times, agents in
an auction would still prefer placing a bid to abstaining.13 On the contrary, giv-
ing a negative feedback becomes less attractive because of the fear of retaliation.
Therefore, from a welfare point of view, the presence of a last minute is desirable
in the context of feedbacks, whereas in the context of bids, it is not necessarily so.
12 See, for example, Resnick, Kuwabara, Zeckhauser, and Friedman (2000), Resnick and Zeck-
hauser (2001), Bajari and Hortaçsu (2004), Cabral and Hortaçsu (2005), and Chwelos and Dhar
(2005).
13 For example, Amazon type auctions end only when no more bids are placed.
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4.2 The eBay Feedback Mechanism
eBay is by far the biggest internet trading platform that brings together both pri-
vate and professional buyers and sellers. In 2005, the number of listings exceeded
1.9 billion and eBay’s gross merchandise volume accounted to more than 44 bil-
lion U.S. dollars.14 Amongst other services, eBay provides a second price auction
mechanism in which the seller describes the object and specifies a reservation
price as well as the length of the auction period. Then, potential buyers can enter
their bids.
As a matter of principle, eBay is only involved in the post auction transac-
tion process if problems arise. In general, information on the conduct of the two
parties is neither observable to us nor to future trading partners. However, eBay
encourages its users to leave a feedback for each other within 90 days after the
termination of the auction.15 If a feedback is given, it consists of a positive or neg-
ative or neutral mark, and is accompanied by unformatted comments. For every
user, eBay keeps a feedback record which contains all feedbacks received and left
from transactions in which she was involved.16 A recorded feedback cannot be re-
moved unless both parties agree to. All marks are summarized in a feedback score
and several summary statistics including the percentage of positive feedbacks.17
While the feedback score can easily be observed by any partner in the bidding
process, the observation of the detailed remarks is more involved.
In order to investigate the possibility of strategic feedback behavior, let us
now discuss the decision to give feedback. At first, we make the simplifying
assumptions that the timing of this decision is restricted to the 90 day period after
the end of the auction and that there is no possibility to withdraw feedbacks. In
Section 5 below, we will comment in detail on these assumptions and provide a
schematic sensitivity analysis. A decision tree for the “feedback game” that starts
after the end of an auction is provided in Appendix A.
For ease of the exposition, we follow the literature and occasionally group
neutral and negative marks together, see e.g. Resnick and Zeckhauser (2001) and
Cabral and Hortaçsu (2005). We will refer to them as negatives.18 Moreover,
in the sequel we refer to the first and second feedback as feedback and reply,
14 See http://investor.ebay.com/news/Q405/EBAY0118-123321.pdf (February 2006).
15 More precisely, eBay encourages, and guarantees recording feedback only within this period.
An informal survey and the empirical evidence suggest that feedback thereafter is extremely rare.
We will further comment on this in Section 5 below.
16 eBay also offers internet shop services. Thus, feedbacks may also be based on experiences in
trading via this channel, rather than auction trading.
17 The feedback score is calculated as the number of users who left at least one positive feedback
minus the number of users who left at least one negative feedback.
18 However, we should emphasize that separating neutral from negative marks would not quali-
tatively change our results.
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respectively.
We now juxtapose two modes of feedback behavior: truth telling, or non
strategic feedback, as opposed to strategic, or opportunistic feedback. The former
truthfully reveals information on the outcome of the transaction and thus leads to
establishing credible feedback records, whereas the latter yields potentially biased
reports, as they are influenced by the anticipation of the possible reaction of the
trading partner.
Consider two parties in an eBay transaction, a buyer and a seller. Suppose
that both are planning to interact with other partners in the future, and therefore
attach positive value to their reputation. That is, both agents derive positive utility
(expected pay off) from a positive, zero utility from no, and negative utility from a
negative feedback received. This will be the case as long as there is some potential
future trading partner believing that the feedback score is informative about the
likely behavior of its holder.19
If the parties truthfully report their evaluation of the transaction without taking
into account the reaction to their feedback in form of a reply, they should be indif-
ferent about the timing of the feedback. However, the fact that delayed delivery or
payment is seen as bad performance should imply that some negatives are given
relatively late. In the empirical analysis, we disentangle this delay from a strategic
delay.
On eBay, feedbacks are immediately observable to the counterpart. If the
parties are influenced by strategic considerations, the timing at which feedbacks
are left may thus become relevant.20
Suppose the two agents believe that their partners may have a tendency to
reciprocate positive and retaliate negative feedbacks. This tendency to reciprocate
may be due to behavioral components in agents’ decision making processes, sim-
ilar to the ones found by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), due to the attempt to build up a
reputation as a “reciprocator” or “impersonator” in order to discourage future neg-
ative feedbacks and encourage positive ones—“the high courtesy equilibrium” of
Resnick and Zeckhauser (2001)—, or due to a combination of both motives. The
quotes in the Introduction indicate that such beliefs are realistic.
Suppose, in addition, that agents believe that the likelihood to receive a reply
19 As was already pointed out in footnote 5 price effects of reputation are usually found to be
nonnegative. Therefore, a “good” reputation is valuable to sellers. In principle, potential buyers
in an auction could distinguish feedbacks the seller has received as a seller from feedbacks she
has received as a buyer. However, it is a complex task to infer separate summary statistics from
the records. See also Cabral and Hortaçsu (2005) who find that at least some sellers were able to
build up their reputation as buyers. Even pure buyers can benefit from a “good” reputation record
since sellers are allowed to exclude buyers from their auctions. This is possible on the basis of
their subjective judgement of a bidder’s reputation record.
20 This is made explicit in Appendix A using the decision tree.
72 Chapter 4. Last Minute Feedback
positive 0.982
feedback neutral 0.008
negative 0.01
2, 471, 459 observations.
Tab. 4.1: Sample probabilities for the type of feedback.
to their feedback is decreasing with the time at which feedback is left after the end
of the auction. This is a reasonable expectation given that attention is costly and
is likely to be fading in time. For obvious reasons this probability tends to zero
when the first feedback is given very close to the expiration of the 90 day period
after which feedbacks cannot be left any more—in the last minute.
Then, agents willing to post a negative feedback for a non performing partner
will find it convenient to wait and do it in the last minute in order to minimize
the likelihood that their counterpart notes the negative feedback and has time to
retaliate. Conversely, agents willing to post a first positive feedback will find it
convenient to do it early in order to maximize the likelihood that their counterpart
notes and reciprocates it.
Therefore, ceteris paribus, we expect for feedbacks that are left strategically
that the first feedback will be given early when it is positive, in order to encourage
positive reciprocation. Conversely, we expect it to be given late, or not at all, when
it is negative—in order to reduce the likelihood of receiving a retaliatory negative
feedback. Because of this, we also expect positive feedbacks to be reciprocated
more often than negative feedbacks to be retaliated.
4.3 Feedback Patterns
The data for the empirical analysis were collected in the second quarter of 2005
from the eBay platform. Starting from randomly drawn auctions we created a
data set consisting of 2, 471, 459 auction records including respective feedbacks
and their timing. By construction, the data include auctions for which at least
one feedback was left. It is a random sample with respect to the category of the
auctioned good which we think is appropriate for the purpose of this empirical
analysis since we want to study feedback behavior in general. The data collection
procedure is described in more detail in Appendix B.
Table 4.1 contains sample probabilities for the feedback being positive, neu-
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reply
positive neutral negative missing
unconditional 0.697 0.003 0.006 0.295
positive 0.709 0.002 0.002 0.288
feedback neutral 0.044 0.096 0.042 0.818
negative 0.025 0.010 0.367 0.598
2, 471, 459 observations.
Tab. 4.2: Unconditional and conditional sample probabilities for the reply.
tral, or negative.21 Observe that 98 per cent of all feedbacks given are positive.
Resnick and Zeckhauser (2001) report a similar table and find that at least one
feedback is left in 52 per cent of the transactions. If reporting was truthful and
non strategic, the other 48 per cent of the feedbacks could reasonably be assumed
to be missing at random. Otherwise, it could well be that neutrals or negatives are
hiding behind these missing feedbacks.
Table 4.2 contains unconditional and conditional sample probabilities for the
reply being positive, neutral, negative, or missing. In 70 per cent of the cases a
reply is left. In about 71 per cent of the cases we observe that a positive feedback
is reciprocated whereas only in about 37 per cent of the cases a negative feedback
is retaliated.
We have argued in Section 2 that the relationship between the timing and type
of the feedback is key in trying to understand these empirical phenomena.
In Figure 4.1, we have plotted the dependence between the reply and both
the time of the feedback and its type. This was done by nonparametric local
linear regressions of indicator variables for the type of the reply on the time of the
feedback.22 All graphs show that the later the feedback is given the less likely it is
that a reply is given at all. More precisely, the probability that a reply is missing
is increasing in time. This observation is independent of the type of the feedback.
In Figure 4.2, we document the timing of feedbacks. It shows empirical dis-
tribution functions of the time the feedback is given conditioned on the type of
feedback. In particular, we find that in a first order stochastic dominance sense
feedback is given earlier if it is positive rather than neutral, and in turn neutral
21 Recall that this refers to the first feedback, as opposed to the second feedback which we call
“reply.”
22 We used a Gaussian kernel. It turned out that the choice of the bandwidth did not have a
substantial impact on these estimates. Here, we chose them ad hoc. Notice that the bootstrapped
confidence intervals are extremely narrow due to the size of the data set.
74 Chapter 4. Last Minute Feedback
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
0 30 60 90
time of the feedback in days
reply positive
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
0 30 60 90
time of the feedback in days
reply neutral or negative
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
0 30 60 90
time of the feedback in days
reply missing
Fig. 4.1: The probability of a positive (top), negative or neutral (middle), and missing
(bottom) reply given a positive (solid line) and negative or neutral (dashed line)
feedback against time of the feedback. Local linear regressions and bootstrapped
95 per cent confidence intervals (100 replications).
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Fig. 4.2: Empirical cumulative distribution functions for the timing of the feedback given
that it is positive, neutral, or negative (from left to right). Note that negative and
neutral feedbacks are given later in a first order stochastic dominance sense.
rather than negative. With respective p-values of 0 this is confirmed by one-sided
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests.
These estimates are complemented with estimated conditional probabilities of
the feedback being positive as well as the probability of a feedback being neutral
or negative, conditional on the time of the feedback, respectively. Recall that most
feedback is positive and is left relatively early within the 90 day period. However,
Figure 4.3 shows that the later the feedback is left, the more likely it is to be
negative or neutral—even culminating into a spike right at the end of the 90 day
period. Hence, there is last minute feedback in the sense that feedback left in the
“last minute” is much more likely to be negative.
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Fig. 4.3: The probability of a positive (top) and neutral/negative (bottom) feedback
against time. Local linear regressions and bootstrapped 95 per cent confidence
intervals (100 replications).
4.4. Strategic Feedback Behavior 77
4.4 Strategic Feedback Behavior
We have documented the existence of a robust “Last Minute Feedback” effect for
negative feedbacks, and of a symmetric early feedback effect for positive ones.
In Section 2, we have argued that feedbacks are possibly given late when they
are negative because agents strategically postpone the time at which the negative
feedback is left to minimize the likelihood of retaliation. However, even if feed-
back behavior was non strategic, negative or neutral marks could be given later
simply because the transaction was delayed and therefore, a negative or neutral
feedback is left. These effects could entirely stem from transactions characterized
by late delivery in which a truthful negative report is posted late. Conversely, those
transactions characterized by timely delivery on both sides are likely to produce
truthful positive feedbacks that are posted early. Resnick and Zeckhauser (2001,
Table 2) have analyzed the feedback comments belonging to a sample of negative
or neutral marks. On one hand, they find that 11 per cent of the complaints were
about slow shipment. Additionally, in 23 per cent of the cases buyers claimed not
to have received the item after they had paid for it. Hence, there is at least some
scope for delays. On the other hand, however, in 24 per cent of the cases the good
was shipped in time but was in poor condition, thus giving room for truthful neg-
ative and timely feedback. While these observations contribute to the explanation
of the observed pattern, they quantitatively work in the same direction as the in-
centive to act strategically, and thus to postpone negative or neutral marks. In this
section we present evidence strongly suggesting that delayed performance is not
the only driving force of late negative feedbacks, i.e. that agents do indeed leave
feedbacks strategically.
4.4.1 Last Minute Feedback
Figure 4.3 shows that the probability that a negative or neutral feedback is left in-
creases in the first 30 to 40 days after the end of an auction. This increase could be
explained by information revelation over time in problematic, possibly delayed,
transactions which result in a negative or neutral feedback. Thereafter, until the
last day of the 90 day feedback period, the probability of a negative or neutral
mark seems not to depend on the timing of the feedback. However, it increases
dramatically on the 90th day after the end of an auction. As for statistical infer-
ence, we have regressed an indicator variable for a negative or neutral feedback
on a spline function in the time of the feedback, controlling for experience of the
trading partners, and on whether the feedback was left by the buyer or the seller.
It reveals that the probability that a given feedback is negative or neutral on the
last half a day of the 90 day period after the end of the auction increases by about
6 per cent on average. This increase is highly significant at any level. This can
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Fig. 4.4: Empirical cumulative distribution functions for the timing of the feedback given
that it is given by the seller and that it is positive positive, buyer and positive,
buyer and negative or neutral, seller and negative or neutral (from left to right).
hardly be reconciled with non strategic behavior since that would require that all
of a sudden more negative or neutral than positive information on the trading part-
ner would be revealed on the second half of the 90th day, compared to the 50 day
period preceding this day.
4.4.2 The Role of the ‘Role’
In general, we suppose sellers to be more likely to be sellers in future transactions
so that they are more interested in getting a positive feedback and avoiding a neg-
ative one. In consequence, the effects we have documented so far should be more
pronounced for sellers once agents act strategically, since sellers’ interest in their
reputation is higher. Figure 4.4 shows that feedbacks are in fact given substan-
tially earlier if they are positive and given by the seller, as compared to positives
given by the buyer. Along these lines, we nd that negative or neutral marks are
given later by sellers.23 We interpret this as further evidence for strategic behavior.
4.4.3 The Effect of Experience
In several decades of experimental economics evidence has been accumulated on
the effect of players’ experience in strategic interactions. An important aspect
23 With respective p-values of 0 one-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicate that positive feed-
back is given earlier and negative feedback is given later by sellers.
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Fig. 4.5: Empirical cumulative distribution functions for the timing of the feedback given
high experience and the feedback being positive, low experience and positive,
low experience and negative or neutral, high experience and negative or neutral
(from left to right).
therein is a deepened understanding of the opponent’s strategic reaction to one’s
own action once a strategic situation is experienced repeatedly. On eBay, a proxy
for experience that is easily observable is an agent’s feedback score. Once feed-
back behavior is strategic, we should therefore again expect the observed patterns
to be more pronounced for experienced agents. Figure 4.5 shows that this is the
case in our data.24 High experience is defined by a feedback score of at least 20.
We have also run regressions in which we include the role of the agent giving feed-
back and its experience as explanatory variables. The results confirm this finding
since the effect is statistically significant at any level. Such an analysis is sensible
because experience and role are positively correlated.
4.4.4 Tools
In further support of these findings, it has been suggested in various newsgroups to
set up a service that automates strategic feedback timing. In a typical conversation,
a user suggests25
24 With respective p-values of 0 one-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicate that positive feed-
back is given earlier and negative feedback is given later by experienced agents.
25 See, e.g.,
http://community.auctionsniper.com/groupee/forums/a/tpc/f/785608021/m/308108399/r/3721016131
(February 2006). The quotes that follow are taken from this site.
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will someone out there please invent FEEDBACK SNIPER SOFT-
WARE that allows one to leave feedback (good or bad) at the last
second? that way, you can leave legit[imate] bad feedback w[ith] no
fear of retaliatory bad feedback left for you- thus purifying the ebay
world, making ebay stock go up, and just making ebay a better com-
munity as a whole. i do not leave deserved bad feedback for fear of
retaliatory bad feedback left on me!!!
And indeed, Auctionhawk, a company specialized on offering services around
eBay, developed and advertised a service, for payment, to give feedback in the last
minute.26 The discussion from above, however, continues with the remark that
It has already been suggested on this forum a handful of times. The
problem is that it’s not an exact 90 days. It can be several days longer.
and the reply
random time and not 90 days, eh? that would definitely throw the
idea for a loop. if we could isolate the time generator at ebay and
get a handle on how these times are generated we could do it an ebay
would be a purer place as crooks would think twice about fraud.
In fact, Auctionhawk has stopped advertising this feature in the meantime.
Strategic implications of the randomness of the last minute will be at the center of
our discussion in Subsection 4.5.1.
4.5 Mutual Feedback Withdrawal and Extended Feedback Periods
So far, we have abstracted from two features that are peculiar to the eBay feedback
mechanism. First, feedbacks and replies can be left more than 90 days after the
end of the auction and second, feedbacks and replies can be withdrawn if both
parties agree to. We discuss the implications of these institutional details in the
following two subsections.
4.5.1 Extended Feedback Periods
So far, we assumed that feedbacks can only be left within 90 days from the end of
the auction. While eBay guarantees that feedback comments are recorded if left
within 90 days after the end of the auction, it is a little known fact that this does
26 See http://auctionbytes.com/cab/abn/y04/m08/i10/s01 (February 2006). A free re-
minder service for “last minute feedback” is offered by U.K. Auction Watch at
http://www.ukauctionhelp.co.uk/remindme.php (February 2006).
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not exclude the possibility of leaving feedback after this 90 day period. In eBay’s
own words: “eBay only commits to items being available for 90 days, so if it is
greater than 90 days you may not be able to leave feedback.”27
After 90 days, eBay removes the link on a member’s personal “My eBay”
page that encourages one to leave feedback. However, since the item number
identifying a particular transaction is known in principle, one might still be able
to leave feedback for a transaction by doing so manually. This finding is connected
to what we experienced during our data collection: in feedback profiles auction
details are linked for 90 days after the feedback was left or received. If details are
not linked, this does not necessarily imply that they are not available any more.
In our random sample of auctions we found only very few cases in which
feedback was left more than 90 days after the end of an auction. In particular,
only 0.03 per cent of the feedbacks and 0.06 per cent of the replies were given
after 90 days. If the feedback was negative, the probability that is was given after
90 days was only 0.4 per cent. In this case, the probability of a retaliative reply is
20 per cent.
From these findings we conclude that the possibility of leaving feedback later
than 90 days after the end of an auction seems to be a little known secret and we
doubt that many users consider the chance that even their “last minute” feedback
could be followed by retaliation.
Even if it was publicly known that leaving feedback for longer than 90 days is
possible, our analysis and conclusions would change only slightly. The empirical
evidence in favor of the explanation given in this paper, namely the difference in
the timing of positive and negative feedbacks we found, remains unchanged.
As for agents’ strategic situation, what matters is the effect of such a “random
last minute” on the decision to leave a feedback. For any given time at which a
feedback is left, the possibility for the other agent to reply after the 90 day deadline
simply increases the likelihood of receiving such a reply. Specifically, for positive
feedbacks, this marginally increases the incentive to leave a positive feedback.
Conversely, the extended period tends to further discourage negative feedbacks.
It allows the agent to postpone a first negative feedback even more (after the 90th
day). This is at the risk that the negative feedback is not registered. The benefit
is a lower probability that the feedback is retaliated if the attention of the trading
partner is fading over time.
All in all, we conclude that the uncertain length of the extended period in
which a feedback can be given works against finding evidence for “last minute
feedback” by making the “last minute” a probabilistic deadline. We still found
this evidence in the data and believe our empirical results would be stronger if the
period for leaving feedbacks would be of fixed length.
27 See http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/questions/leaving-feedback.html (February 2006).
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4.5.2 Mutual Feedback Withdrawal
A less well known feature of the eBay feedback mechanism is that, after feed-
backs are given, they can be withdrawn upon the mutual approval by both parties.
All feedbacks given up to the time of the withdrawal are removed and no more
feedback can be left. If feedbacks are removed, they do not enter the calculation
of the feedback score but remain in the parties’ feedback histories as “withdrawn”
feedbacks. Additionally, the number of withdrawn feedbacks is shown next to
the members’ feedback summary. Surprisingly, in our data, only 0.1 per cent of
all feedbacks were withdrawn, 25 per cent of these within two days after the last
feedback was left.28
Obviously, the possibility to withdraw feedbacks increases agents’ ability to
renegotiate in order to reach a final agreement. It allows agents to trade feedbacks,
in particular a withdrawn negative for a withdrawn negative. This ability to rene-
gotiate may have negative effects on the informational content of the feedback
mechanism by promoting strategic, i.e. non-truthful, feedbacks.29
While it is observable whether feedbacks were withdrawn, we cannot observe
whether the withdrawn feedbacks were positives or negatives. However, under
the assumption that a good reputation record is valuable to at least one party,
two positives should never be withdrawn. Therefore, we restrict our attention to
situations in which at least one negative feedback was left.
Withdrawal of Two Negative Feedbacks
Rational agents and backward induction. The simplest among these situations, the
one in which we expect most feedbacks to be withdrawn, is the case in which two
negative feedbacks were left. Suppose both parties in the transaction value not
having negative feedbacks more than the procedural cost of withdrawing feed-
backs, are rational and not norm guided, and have a negligible chance of trading
again in the future. Suppose further that observing and interpreting an agent’s past
feedback behavior—how has an agent left feedbacks and reacted to other agents’
28 Note that in principle, we could have missed some late feedbacks and late feedback with-
drawals if they occurred very late after the end of the auction, say 125 days. This is due to the
design of the data collection procedure and it would be beyond the scope of this paper to improve
on this. However, in view of the observation that already between the 90th and 100st day after
the end of the auction incidences of feedback activity decline to a negligible number we are only
missing very few feedbacks.
29 See Dini and Spagnolo (2005a) for a general result. This is why Dini and Spagnolo (2005b)
and Dellarocas, Dini, and Spagnolo (forthcoming) suggest to keep feedback mechanisms unilateral
whenever it is possible: then, trading a positive feedback against a positive feedback is not an
option. Provided that other forms of (e.g. monetary) trade are costly the informational content of
such feedbacks increases. The empirical results in Chwelos and Dhar (2005) nicely support this
policy prescription.
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feedbacks in the past?—is too costly relative to the value of the transaction. Then,
simple backward induction applies and suggests that two negative feedbacks will
always be renegotiated and withdrawn, independent of the history that led to them.
We found the following advice in a guide entitled “How to Sell on eBay”:30
However much you’re not supposed to do it, you really shouldn’t let
a buyer leave you negative feedback without leaving them a nega-
tive in return . . . This might not be the ’nicest’ way to do business
on eBay, but it’s the only realistic way to protect your flawless rep-
utation. Don’t be worried: retaliatory feedback is not against eBay’s
rules, however much it should be. Anyway, you’re not just doing this
for revenge—it’s essential for the next step. Try for a Mutual With-
drawal. Since the buyer probably won’t want a negative response or
feedback comment on their record, you can do a simple “I’ll take
away my negative if you take away yours” deal. This is called mutual
feedback withdrawal, and the process can be started at this page:. . .
Reputation as a punisher. For Sections 3 and 4’s empirical analysis we have
coded withdrawn feedbacks as negatives. Surprisingly, even under this assump-
tion, only 22 per cent of all retaliated feedbacks were mutually withdrawn after-
wards.31 Not withdrawing a negative feedback may serve as a signalling device
for an agent because she can thereby build a reputation as a “tough” punisher to
deter future cheating, or receiving negative feedbacks.32
Experience. We consider it more likely that many agents involved in badly
performing transactions were unexperienced and did not know about the possibil-
ity of withdrawal. To test this hypothesis we calculated withdrawal probabilities
by the experience of the trading partners. We say that an agent is experienced
if her feedback score is at least 10. If both trading partners are experienced, the
probability of a feedback to be withdrawn was 23.5 per cent. If only one of them
was inexperienced, this number declined to about 18.5 per cent. Unfortunately,
even in our large data set there is no case in which both trading partners were in-
experienced and a feedback was withdrawn. This shows once more that strategic
behavior is promoted by experience.
Withdrawal as a threat. Alternatively, assume that agents believe there exist
potential trading partners who do not fear retaliation because they do not value
30 See http://www.askaboutthis.com/ebay/articles/How-to-Dispute-Unfair-Ratings-on-eBay.html
(February 2006), line breaks were removed.
31 Note, however, that our findings are robust to feedback withdrawal: dropping all observations
in which feedback was withdrawn did not change our results.
32 This requires that observing and analyzing an agent’s past feedback behavior is an option for
at least some potential future trading partners. We are sceptical about this possibility, given how
complex it is to track and interpret an agent’s past feedback behavior by manually going through
her feedback history.
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their own reputation. These could, e.g., be occasional buyers paying in advance.
Such agents could make use of the possibility to withdraw feedbacks to signal
toughness by giving a negative feedback early, before the good is delivered. The
signal to the trading partner would be that their valuation for reputation is low
so that they are always prepared to give a negative or retaliate a negative without
withdrawing it thereafter if the delivered good does not conform to promises. This
can be used to exact performance of the other trading partner.
Withdrawal of One Negative Feedback
In case only one negative feedback was given, naturally, only one party is inter-
ested in the withdrawal of this feedback. Suppose reports were truthful, so that
one party (say the seller) was satisfied by the trading partner’s performance (say
prompt payment), but the other party was not (the buyer found the good of lower
than expected quality). Then, the unsatisfied party that left a negative could agree
to withdraw the feedbacks in exchange for a discount in price, or the seller’s will-
ingness to take back the good. However, in general, these “renegotiated” trans-
actions are hard to enforce. Since feedbacks are already given, and can only be
jointly withdrawn, there is no guarantee for the accomplishment of such a new
agreement. In our example, after the seller accepts to take back the good, if she
returns the money first the buyer could be inclined not to return the good, or not to
agree to withdraw the feedback given that hers is positive. Likewise, if the good
is sent back first, the seller may not want to return the money. These enforcement
problems of ex post renegotiation in asymmetric situations, where no feedback
mechanism is present to limit opportunism, let us believe that most withdrawn
feedbacks are couples of negatives.
4.6 Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have highlighted empirical phenomena such as “last minute (neg-
ative) feedbacks” and have reconciled them with an idea of agents’ strategic feed-
back behavior on eBay. In particular, we have shown evidence indicating that
agents tend to anticipate reactions of the trading partner in the “feedback game”
when they leave feedback.
Moreover, agents seem to be aware of the risk that a negative feedback is re-
taliated. This implies that positive feedbacks are usually given early, with the aim
of stimulating reciprocation, and negative feedbacks are given late or not given at
all, in fear of retaliation. Therefore, positive feedbacks are likely to be given too
often and negatives are likely to be given too seldom. Hence, negative feedbacks,
if they are given, typically contain more information than positive ones. In gen-
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eral, the informational content of feedback histories in such eBay type bilateral
feedback mechanisms appears to be low.
Let us finally develop some ideas towards improving on the design of the
feedback mechanism.33 Our analysis suggests that the “feedback game” should
be made less transparent to both parties. In particular, favorable “anonymity”
should be pursued, so that both feedbacks are revealed to the trading partners
and the public only if no more feedbacks can be left. This could be done after
a fixed period, or after both have already given their feedback. Note that this
device requires that feedback withdrawal is not possible. Otherwise, under general
conditions, it is a dominant strategy for the players to always leave a negative
feedback in order to be able to renegotiate after feedbacks have been revealed.
In general, the performance of buyers, if asked to pay first, is subject to little
uncertainty. It is also easier to discipline them: either the full payment arrives in
time, and bank transfer details can demonstrate this, or it does not. Sellers can
instead “cheat” in non evident ways on a variety of aspects of their performance,
and this opaqueness creates room for opportunistic behavior. Therefore, it may be
worthwhile to limit feedbacks to buyers rating sellers as in Amazon auctions.34
We shall end with the appeal that35
Sooner or later we all face this dilemma on e-Bay. Do we slag an ob-
vious jerk with a negative feedback, only to get a retaliatory negative
feedback from him. You have to decide if it’s worth it. Always check
out his feedback first. See if he posts retaliatory feedbacks. Avoid
him like the plague if he does. In your case, seeing as how you aren’t
out any cash, I would just let this one slide. Let this moron fester
in his own little crooked world. There are a lot of goofs out there in
e-Bayland, just steer clear of them if possible. IMHO [in my humble
opinion], save your negative feedbacks for the really bad experiences
that cost you serious money. Cheers!
33 Roth (2002) makes a strong case for economists helping to design markets and institutions.
34 This is also suitable for e-procurement platforms. See Dini and Spagnolo (2005a, 2005b) for
further details.
35 Taken from http://antiqueradios.com/forums/Forum14/HTML/000994.html (February 2006).
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Appendix A: Decision Tree
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 describe the decision tree for the “feedback game” that starts
right after the end of the auction. Here, we assume for simplicity that feedback
can be left for 90 days. Together, Figures 4.6 and 4.7 depict the 90 days long
decision tree as a continuum of decision nodes. Starting from the first instant
after the auction agents 1 and 2, which we treat symmetrically, simultaneously
choose whether or not to give a feedback, as long as neither of them has placed
their feedback yet. The first decision node of Figure 4.6 depicts this simultaneous
game for the first instant of time. Each agent can simultaneously choose among
abstaining from giving feedback (0), giving a positive feedback (+), and giving
a negative or neutral one (−). For instance, a pair (+,−) denotes that agent 1
received a positive mark from agent 2 whereas agent 2 received a negative mark
from agent 1. As usual, the information set at 2’s decision node implies that 1 and
2’s decisions are simultaneous, i.e. that neither of the two players observes the
trading partner’s decision for that instant before choosing. If both 1 and 2 choose
to give a feedback in an instant of time, the “feedback game” ends and the two
feedbacks are recorded and become observable on the platform. If one of the two
agents gives her feedback and the other does not, the other agent will be able to
observe the feedback received an instant of time later, and will remain the only one
with a choice to make. As long as both 1 and 2 choose not to give feedback and
the last instant is not reached, the simultaneous game starts again in the following
instant of time. Once the “last minute” is reached, i.e. the last instant of the 90
days in which a feedback can be given, the simultaneous decision node changes
form into that described in Figure 4.7.
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Fig. 4.6: Decision tree before the last minute.
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Appendix B: Data Collection
We first randomly drew auction numbers and downloaded the respective auction
details. From these auction details we obtained the respective seller member ID
and randomly selected 10, 000 sellers from the United States.
In a next step, for each seller, we used the information in her feedback pro-
file to obtain auction details including the corresponding feedback which was re-
ceived and left, and the respective timing information. By construction, since we
start from a member’s feedback profile, our sample consists of auction records for
which at least one feedback was left by either the seller or the buyer. In order to
minimize the loss of information, we included only those auctions into our data
set which ended at least 100 days before the date of our data collection. Moreover,
we required the auctions to have ended at most 125 days before the date of our
data collection. This value is suggested by the data because after 125 days auction
details might not be available any more.
We restricted our attention to standard eBay auctions. That is, we dropped
auctions that belong to “eBay Motors,” are “Live Auctions,” serve as an “Adver-
tisement Only,” and are “Quantity Items.” Moreover, we did not consider auctions
that ended early.
Mutually withdrawn feedbacks were coded as negatives.
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